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TARGET MANAGERS AS NEGOTIATING
AGENTS FOR TARGET SHAREHOLDERS
IN TENDER OFFERS: A REPLY
TO THE PASSIVITY THESIS
Dale A. Oesterlet
In 1981 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel advanced what is
now known as the passivity thesis for tender offers.' They propose
that the management of a corporation subject to a tender offer, the
target, should be prohibited from resisting the offer in any fashion. 2
The authors view hostile takeovers as a significant means of displac-
ing poor managers and argue that facilitating tender offers increases
the incentive of all managers to perform in the best interests of their
shareholders. 3 The passivity thesis has found a sympathetic audi-
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971, M.P.P. 1974, J.D.
1975, Univ. of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Profes-
sors Douglas Branson, Roger Dennis, Russell Osgood, and Stewart Schwab on drafts of
this article.
1 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel I].
See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel II]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk
Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook &
Fischel III]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1155 (1982).
2 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel would, for example, preclude a target's man-
agement from manipulating the target's assets or capital structure to make the target
less attractive to a potential acquirer, from contesting the legality of an offer under fed-
eral antitrust or securities law, from buying off bidders, and from seeking and favoring
other bidders. For a list of popular takeover defenses, see Lipton & Brownstein, Take-
over Responses and Directors'Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1414-26 (1985).
Some specific tactics are discussed in this Article. See infra notes 38-40 (shark repellent
amendments), 53-54 (antitrust obstacles), 56-58 (litigation), 125-30 (stock plans) and
accompanying text.
3 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1174-82. There are two basic forms of
managerial inefficiency: poor administrative decisions arising from ineptitude, excessive
risk-aversion, or simply laziness; and a siphoning off of benefits belonging to sharehold-
ers. A bidder presumably will offer a premium over market price for control of an inef-
ficiently managed company because the bidder expects to realize a profit by replacing
the existing management with superior administrators. See Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110, 113 (1965). If managers cannot obstruct
tender offers, they can protect against a takeover only by maximizing the value of the
company's stock, in short, by managing efficiently. See 1985 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVI-
SORS ANN. REP. 188-89. For a case study on how the threat of takeovers revitalized a
lethargic industry, see Raiders Sober the Oil Industry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1985 at D1, col.
3.
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ence. Many legal scholars have accepted the basic claim that most
defensive tactics are undesirable, although some authors would pre-
serve management's right to engage in some limited responses.
4
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel justify the passivity thesis
on two grounds. First, they harbor a deep suspicion of both the
competence and the motives of corporate officers who defend
against hostile tender offers. In a subsequent article they stated that
"[i]n most cases resistance reflects either mismanagement (to the ex-
tent it pointlessly denies shareholders the opportunity to obtain a
premium) or manager's self-protection (to the extent its point is to
preserve managers' jobs or 'sell' their acquiescence in exchange for
bonuses or promises of future employment)."' 5 In short, they be-
lieve that target managers who engage in defensive tactics rarely do
so in the best interests of their shareholders. Second, Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that even if target managers defend
against tender offers exclusively in the ostensible best interests of
their shareholders (they seek, for example, to maximize the tender
offer price for their shareholders by seeking higher bidders), there is
a net reduction in shareholders wealth: "By raising the price, auc-
tions reduce the number of acquisitions and thus the amount of
monitoring. The decrease in monitoring results in higher agency
costs of management and thus in lower returns on investment."
6
The passivity rule attempts to address both problems. First, a
blanket prohibition against defensive tactics assumes that only in-
competent and selfish managers obstruct tender offers. Thus, the
4 Professors Bebchuk, Coffee, and Gilson, for example, favor allowing target man-
agement to seek competing bids. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Bebchuk I]; Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23,
23-24 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Bebchuk II]; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corpo-
rate Control. A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1984); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STA. L. REV. 51 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Gilson I]; Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819, 868-75 (1980-8 1) [hereinafter cited as Gilson II]. Professor Carney
argues for allowing target management to support shareholder amendments to the cor-
porate charter. See Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout
Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 341, 342 (1983).
Professor Lowenstein, although skeptical about the value of takeovers, advocates limit-
ing the scope of target management resistance to devices that provide shareholders
more time to consider a tender offer. See Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Take-
overs: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 322-33 (1983). Dissenters to the
passivity thesis include Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of
Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977 (1983); Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1231 (1980); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 882 (1978).
5 Easterbrook & Fischel III, supra note 1, at I (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 2.
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rule eliminates the need for a case by case determination of whether
target managers are acting in the best interests of their sharehold-
ers.7 Second, a blanket prohibition against defensive tactics, cou-
pled with a repeal of the Williams Act,8 also increases the frequency
of tender offers by reducing the price that bidders must pay to ac-
quire control and by protecting the first bidder from subsequent
bidders who "free ride" on the first bidder's search costs.9 Thus,
the rule enhances the incentive of outsiders to monitor the perform-
ance of corporate executives to the benefit of all shareholders.
This Article discusses separately each justification of the passiv-
ity thesis. In Part I it argues that Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
do not give due regard to the role of loyal and conscientious target
managers. Undoubtedly, self-interest motivates some target manag-
ers to resist a tender offer, and such resistance occurs at the expense
of the target's shareholders. But conscientious target managers do
have a role in advancing their shareholders' interests that their
shareholders acting individually cannot pursue. Quite simply, target
managers can act virtuously as bargaining agents for target share-
holders. 10 From this perspective the two factual predicates of Eas-
terbrook and Fischel's first argument-that there is a high frequency
of target management misbehavior in responding to tender offers
and that it is wasteful to determine on a case by case basis when such
7 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel believe that courts too often favor misbe-
having target managers by applying the deferential business judgment rule and that the
passivity rule "does not require courts to make business decisions." A court need only
determine whether managers were passive. Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at
1198-99.
8 The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 781-n, 78s (1982). Professors Easterbrook
and Fischel believe that the Williams Act allows a target's management time to under-
take a defensive strategy. Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1162-63. See also
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978) (Williams Act operates to detriment of all
shareholders). The Williams Act and rules promulgated thereunder by the Securities
and Exchange Commission regulate tender offers and require disclosure by the offeror
and the target management. For example, Rule 14e-1 of the SEC mandates that the
tender offer must remain open for 20 business days, and if more shares are tendered
than the offeror is willing to buy, the offeror must accept all shares tendered on a pro
rata basis. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1985). See also Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and
Greenmaik Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 284-96 (1985) (discussing fed-
eral securities laws).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 81-86.
10 See, e.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist
Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980). The authors argue that a board can (1) force
the offeror to raise the premium, (2) force the offeror to engage in a negotiated acquisi-
tion on more favorable terms, or (3) attract other offerors. Id. at 109-10. Indeed, direc-
tors may have a fiduciary obligation to maximize the control premium for shareholders.
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (managers violated their fiduciary
duty by, among other things, agreeing not to solicit other offers and not to furnish infor-
mation to other potential bidders).
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misbehavior occurs-are open to serious question."'
In Part II this Article considers the second argument of Profes-
sors Easterbrook and Fischel and concludes that, once target man-
agers are limited to their proper role as bargaining agents, a claim
that an absolute bar on defensive tactics by target managers would
significantly increase total shareholder wealth is problematic. The
rule will encourage shareholders and their managers to use alter-
nate devices in order to gain collective negotiation leverage against
bidders, and these devices are often much less efficient than a dele-
gation of bargaining power to an agent. Indeed, this avoidance be-
havior may block tender offers that currently are successful. Thus,
the Article concludes that a practical, and politically feasible, solu-
tion aimed at optimizing the wealth effects of hostile tender offers is
an informed program of judicial supervision.
Finally, in Part III the Article suggests legal standards that
courts could use to effectively police target managers. Although
courts have exhibited an intuitive recognition of the role of target
managers as bargaining agents, they have yet to develop a sophisti-
cated case law that defines its implications. Indeed, courts searching
currently for standards often reach unsound conclusions.' 2 That
courts' views have not matured does not mean that they cannot ma-
ture, however, and Part III contains guidelines for judicial analysis.
I
ARE MOST DEFENSIVE TACTICS CONTRARY TO THE
SHAREHOLDERS' BEST INTERESTS?
A. Two-Tier Tender Offers: The Stampede Effect and the
Need for a Collective Shareholder Response
Central to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel's argument for a
blanket prohibition on all defensive tactics is their argument distin-
guishing resistance to a tender offer from other kinds of manage-
ment decisions that affect directly a manager's personal wealth.
Corporate managers, subject to court review,' 3 have long made de-
cisions on executive compensation, on contracts with entities in
which executives have an interest, and on refusals to merge or sell
the company in direct negotiations (which may preserve executive
11 This argument and its answer are versions of the Type I/Type II error analysis of
legal rules developed in the Law and Economics school. See generally Ehrlich & Posner,
An Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Landes & Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Typical Analysis, 19 J. LAw & EcoN. 249 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Carney, Takeover Tussles: The Court's Tug-of-War with Corporate Boards, 54
Bus. & Soc. REv. 64 (1985) (commenting on two recent cases from Delaware).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 94-100.
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positions). 4 Some nineteenth century courts imposed a blanket
prohibition on transactions between a corporation and its execu-
tives, but later courts have recognized that this position is too con-
fining.' 5 The prohibition prevents beneficial arrangements, and
judicial supervision can adequately protect shareholders from man-
agers who breach their duty of loyalty.' 6 This lesson, that blanket
prohibitions disabling corporate managers are often counter-
productive, continues to guide courts.
Why are target managers' responses to hostile tender offers so
different? Professors Easterbrook and Fischel answer:
Conflicts transactions outside the realm of tender offers are not
similarly interdicted because they typically involve corporate deci-
sions that shareholders, as a practical matter, simply cannot make.
But in deciding whether to accept or reject a tender offer, manag-
ers enjoy no particular comparative advantage over shareholders.
The decision does not involve management of the corporation's
affairs in any meaningful sense and thus can be made by share-
holders even though they are not involved in those affairs to any
significant degree.
17
Shareholders cannot resolve conflicts transactions other than tender
offers because "[t]hese types of decisions, regardless of the inevita-
ble conflict of interest, must be made by management as agents for
the firm; the shareholders themselves have neither the time, the ex-
pertise, nor the interest to become involved with running the corpo-
ration's affairs."' 8
On its face the distinction is appealing; target shareholders can
judge just as well as target managers whether to sell or hold shares
in light of market conditions. Indeed, reasonably diligent share-
holders routinely make such decisions. Thus, whenever target man-
agers block what otherwise would be a successful tender offer, they
are standing in the way of shareholder wishes. Yet, the argument is
not sound. Shareholders acting individually will accept a tender of-
fer that acting collectively they would reject, and target management
14 State corporation codes require that a corporation's shareholders ratify the deci-
sion to merge or to sell a company. The decision not to merge or not to sell is not
subject to such a requirement.
15 E.g., Marsh, Are Directors Trustees, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36-39 (1966) (discussing law
on contracts between an officer and his corporation as of 1880).
16 There is considerable disagreement on how much judicial supervision is needed.
See Buxbaum, Conflict of Interest Statutes and the Need for Demand on Directors in Derivative
Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980). Compare Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. - (1986), with Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A
Response to Fischel & Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. - (1986).
17 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1198 (footnote omitted).
18 Id. at n.106.
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can effect a collective shareholder response. Conscientious manag-
ers of a target company may be able to negotiate with the initial
offeror and other potential bidders to extract gains for the share-
holders that shareholders would not realize if they responded
individually.19
The following two hypothetical cases illustrate the advantage of
a collective shareholder response: In both cases Company A de-
cides that it is willing to pay a fifty percent premium over market
price for a controlling block of shares in Company B. 20 Once A con-
trols B, A will use B's assets to recoup its investment and make a
small profit as well. 21 In situation one, A discovers that a small fam-
19 In response to the argument that target managers may have access to informa-
tion not reflected in the market price of the stock, advocates of the passivity thesis claim
first, that this situation is rare, and second, that if they do have access, target managers
can and will simply inform their shareholders of the concealed information. The fre-
quency of such cases is probably overestimated, but they do occur; the second response
is insufficient for two reasons. First, management may have access to valuable informa-
tion that cannot be made publicly available without destroying its value. See, e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-44, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (cor-
poration discovers ore deposit on land it does not own and secrecy enables it to acquire
mining right at minimal price). Professors Easterbrook and Fischel allow that such cases
may constitute an exception to their theory. Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at
1168 n.19. Second, there are substantial practical problems created by a requirement
that target managers pass all tender offer information on to shareholders. See infra note
115.
20 A may have several reasons to buy B. See infra note 72. The beneficial reasons
include the displacement of poor managers and "synergy" gains. See generally Coffee,
supra note 4, at 1166-67. Synergy gains are created if the target's assets have a unique
value to the bidder. Because of the good fit, the value of the merged companies is
greater than the value of the two companies as independent concerns. This hypothesis
has critics, e.g., Lipton, supra note 4, at 1232-33; Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 249. The
synergy gain is hard to calculate and is often a tar baby for potential bidders. See Bus.
WEEK, June 3, 1985, at 88 (bidders often wildly overestimate gains in deciding to make
tender offers).
21 The size of the premium that A is willing to pay for control depends not only on
the size of gains from A's better use of B's assets, but also on how much of the gain A, as
the new majority shareholder, can claim for itself. To maximize its share of the gains
created by the new combination, A can either use its control of B to distribute the gains
disproportionately between A and the other minority shareholders (some inequality is
legally tolerated, but extreme inequality, known as "looting," is not), orA can eliminate
B's minority shareholders before the gains materialize. A common technique for accom-
plishing the latter approach is a merger in which the minority shareholders receive cash
for their shares. Because such large cash outlays can cause liquidity problems, a second
technique is to give the minority shareholders securities in A in exchange for their B
shares (valued exclusive of the gains), thus diluting their claim to the gains once they are
realized. The most extreme case would be one in which the minority shareholders re-
ceived only debt instruments (bonds or notes) in A for their B common stock.
The success of a majority shareholder in excluding minority shareholders from a
significant participation in the gains created by a tender offer depends crucially, there-
fore, on the inability of minority shareholders either to block these mergers or to seek
court enforced appraisal rights that include a share of the gains from the merger. In
Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983), the court created considerable un-
certainty about the latter issue, however ("elements of future value . . . .which are
(Vol. 71:53
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ily group owns fifty-one percent of B's shares, 22 and none of the
family members holds an executive position in B. 23 A approaches
the family, which appoints X, one of its members, to negotiate the
sale. A initially offers a twenty percent premium. 24 X, on the other
hand, has authorization from her family to sell only at a thirty per-
cent premium. Seeking to maximize her family's gain, X does not
counter with her bottom line position but instead offers to sell at a
sixty percent premium. 25 Further bargaining leads to a sequence of
concessions by both parties, and eventually A and X agree on a sale
known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of specu-
lation, may be considered").
22 Assume that enough shares are outstanding to create a liquid market.
23 This assumption avoids complications by making it less likely that courts will
hold that a family member must apportion the control premium with the minority stock-
holders. Controlling shareholders generally have no duty to share a control premium
with minority shareholders. Compare Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1980) (largest shareholder in a corporation not accountable to minority shareholders for
sale of stock) with Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) (dominant shareholder
accountable to minority shareholders for sale of control), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
24 For the sake of simplicity the example assumes a one-dimensional negotiation
over the value of the stock. One-dimensional negotiations are usually competitive, that
is, the parties do not reveal all relevant information about their interests (for example,
their reservation prices) to one another in the bargaining. Of course, this negotiation
could be multi-dimensional, including in the bargaining possibilities of future employ-
ment, payment terms, and the like. If so, a more cooperative process of bargaining may
produce better results. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotia-
tion: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984).
25 The family may rationally insist on a minimum premium of 30% for three possi-
ble reasons. First, the family may benefit from an unequal division of the benefits of
ownership in B. Through its control of B, the family may extract benefits that are un-
available to minority shareholders, such as placing family members on B's payroll.
Second, the family may believe that another potential buyer will offer at least a 30%
premium for control of B after the family informs the other buyer that A is an interested suitor.
Indeed, X's authorization to accept no less than a 30% premium may be the direct result
of her calling other potential buyers and informing them of A's bid. The timing qualifi-
cation is crucial. If the other purchaser was a willing purchaser before A appeared, then
the family would have sold to it before A appeared on the scene. A's bid releases infor-
mation to the market that is valuable to other potential buyers (so valuable that Easter-
brook and Fischel fear a significant free-rider problem that might discourage first
bidders from searching for targets, see Easterbrook & Fischel III, supra note 1) and en-
courages these buyers to consider entering the bidding. See infra text accompanying
notes 81-86. More thought needs to be given to the kind of information that A's bid
provides other bidders. For example, does A's bid signal to the market that B is poorly
run, or does the bid simply impose a deadline constraint on the other bidders who al-
ready know B is poorly run and have been dragging their feet on making an initial offer?
Third, even if no other bidders are in the market, X may reasonably suspect that A is
a special buyer, willing to offer a 30% premium. This is a classic bilateral monopoly: A
has discovered a special value in B and B knows that it must sell to A to get above market
returns. There is no unique solution to the bargaining. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 316 (1974). This is espe-
cially true if A determines that A and B fit well together and this combination of the two
will produce significant synergy gains. See supra note 20.
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for a premium somewhere between thirty and fifty percent. 26
In case two, numerous shareholders own stock in B, and no
group of shareholders has solidified into a controlling block. Again,
the size of the premium A is willing to offer depends in part on A's
ability to maximize its share of the gains that it will create once it
gains control of B's assets. Case two is otherwise identical to case
one.27 A states to B's board of directors that it is willing to purchase
a controlling block of B's stock at a premium over market price. As
in situation one, A is willing to offer a fifty percent premium but
initially offers only twenty percent. The board suspects that either A
or a third party aware of A's interest would pay more.28 Conse-
quently, the board counters A's offer with a demand for a sixty per-
cent premium hoping to maximize its shareholders' gain on the
transaction. Unlike situation one, however, A can gain control of B
without continuing to bargain with the board by appealing directly
to the shareholders.
A makes a two-tier, front-end loaded bid. A begins, for exam-
ple, a hostile tender offer for fifty-one percent of B's stock by offer-
ing a twenty percent premium, and threatens to force out the
remaining shareholders at a lower price in a takeout merger. 29 If
26 The exact point of agreement will depend on the relative bargaining skill of the
two parties-their coolness under deadline pressure, their concession patterns, their
strategic disclosure of information, their sensitivity to cues on each other's reservation
price, and so on. To induce concessions from A, X may find that threats to break off
negotiations are necessary, buttressed perhaps by threats to find and sell to other poten-
tial buyers. X can, and indeed should, do all this as the faithful agent of her family. A
can offer her a bribe to disadvantage her family in the bargaining (by revealing, for
example, the extent of her authorization so that A can cut the deal at exactly the 30%
premium), but X owes a duty of fidelity to her family and is under a legal obligation to
decline.
In a one-dimensional negotiation, X will attempt to discover and change her oppo-
nent's true bottom line position while convincing her opponent that her bottom line
position is higher than in fact it is. Thus, if X is able to discover that A will pay a 50%
premium and convince A that her final authorization is for a 50 % premium, she will have
maximized her gain (unless, of course, she is able to increase A's reservation price). A
has similar goals. See generally White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 A.B.F. RES. 926.
27 Case two is distinguished from case one in that in case one only the controlling
family split the premium (and some argue the split should not be allowed), while in case
two all the shareholders theoretically have an opportunity to claim the premium. The
distinction is unimportant for the purposes of this Article, however.
28 This analysis assumes that the board's primary motivation for demanding a pre-
mium over market value is not because the board or a controlling group of shareholders
profits currently from an inappropriate division of B's profits.
29 This discussion assumes the legality of the two-tiered tender offer. In a two-
tiered offer, the successful purchaser merges with the target, and the remaining target
shareholders receive securities of the combined entity that are generally worth less than
the tender offer price. See Dennis, supra note 8, at 319-31. Two-tier pricing has been
attacked, so far unsuccessfully, as a manipulative device violative of the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws, Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio
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the board must be passive ° and the Williams Act is repealed, the
stampede effect will cause B's shareholders to tender as quickly as
possible in an effort to secure the tender offer premium.3 1 Each
shareholder must decide whether to sell without time to coordinate
his response with fellow shareholders. Thus, if A structures the of-
fer correctly,3 2 B's shareholders will race to tender their stock be-
cause the tardy will lose the opportunity to share in the tender offer
premium. Other potential bidders will lack time to participate in the
bidding; they can only acquire B's assets by paying the new owner,
A, a higher price.
The coercive effect of a two-tiered tender offer increases as of-
ferors are able to increase the disparity between the tender offer
premium, which is certain, and the prospective value of stock in the
target held subsequent to the completion of the offer, which is spec-
ulative. An offeror can use one of many threats to overcome the
resistance of target shareholders who refuse to tender in the hope of
participating in the gains from the new combination, e.g., a threat to
1982), and as violative of state law. See generally Mirois, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal
and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485 (1983).
Commentators have criticized these second-stage mergers (also known as takeout
or freeze-out mergers). See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 25; Brudney &
Chirelstein, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1072 (1983). The most prominent defenders of the practice are, ex-
pectedly, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel. They argue that unequal sharing of gains
is a necessary incentive to buyers who could not otherwise afford to enter gain-creating
transactions and to sellers who because of a free rider problem would not sell (enough
shareholders will not sell in hopes of sharing in the gain created by the new combination
that the tender offer will fail and none will benefit). See also Dennis, supra note 8, at 339-
41. The argument has appeal, but its proponents have yet to discuss how far one can
take it. If the "free rider" justifies takeout mergers at prices that do not include the
effects of the merger, does it justify other acts by the new directors of the target that
favor the new parent at the expense of residual original shareholders in the target? An
extreme example is bifurcated dividends; should the old shareholders receive dividends
no greater than those they would have received had there been no tender offer, while
the bidder, now holding 51% of the target stock, receives more so it can appropriate the
gains of the merger? Current law prohibits this result, of course, but does the logic of
the free-rider argument justify it?
30 Among other things, B's board and its management cannot pursue negotiations
with or contact any potential bidders.
31 The Delaware Supreme Court uses the term "stampede" in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (1985). Presumably, the term comes from the ten-
dency of most herd animals (with the notable exception of the gnu) to run rather than
collectively confront a predator. Once the herd starts to run, the prudent run with it
because those who refuse to run or those who run too slowly are left to face the predator
alone.
32 A simple offer, such as "starting immediately we will accept 50% of the outstand-
ing shares on a first-come first-serve basis," should suffice. This type of offer, known as
a Saturday Night Special, was legal prior to the passage of the Williams Act. Average
cash tender offer premiums increased from 32% to 53% after the passage of the Wil-
liams Act. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 371, 373 (1980).
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cash out the residual shareholders at a lower price or a threat to
otherwise exclude them from the fruits of the combination (drawing
down the value of their stock below the tender offer price) by
manipulating the assets or capital structure of the target to favor the
new parent.33 What makes these threats so credible is that the of-
feror, accountable to its own shareholders, often must monopolize
the profits created by the combination to get a favorable return on
the huge sum it has spent to acquire the target.3 4 Threats to disad-
vantage residual target shareholders may not be necessary, how-
ever; even a public rumor that falsely creates an overly pessimistic
appraisal of the value of the new combination (and therefore the
value of target shares held after the combination) may suffice.
The stampede effect is so strong that shareholders will choose
to tender even though a majority suspect that another offeror may
make a higher bid or suspect that 4, if pushed, may offer a higher
premium. Shareholders will accept a lower premium because of the
risk that at least fifty-one percent of B's other shareholders, acting
individually, will tender their stock and the nontendering sharehold-
ers will receive less than the tender offer price.3 5 Acting individu-
33 The first threat, despite rumblings in the courts, is ostensibly legal if the value
given residual target shareholders exceeds the premerger market price. See supra note
21. The second threat requires the parent and the new directors of the subsidiary to
finesse the standards of fiduciary duty that ostensibly require the equal treatment of all
shareholders.
34 See supra note 21.
35 This is sometimes loosely referred to as a "prisoner's dilemma," after a game
devised by two psychologists. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 25, at 337; Carney,
supra note 4, at 349-50; Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 307-09. In the game both players
recognize they can both gain from mutual cooperation (each receives 3 units of value),
but each player is also tempted to defect, earning, if the other player does not defect, a
superior individual gain that exceeds the reward for mutual cooperation (5 units) and
inflicting the worst outcome on the other player (0 units: "sucker's payoff"). If both
players defect, however, both players receive a return which is lower than the reward for
mutual cooperation (1 unit). In single decision games, each player typically distrusts the
other, and both choose to defect with the effect that both receive the suboptimal return
(I unit). See generally R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); A. RAPo-
PORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965). In a tender offer the choice to coop-
erate is a choice to bargain collectively (holdout) so as to encourage the bidder to
increase its offer or to encourage other bidders to make offers, and the choice to defect
is the choice to tender immediately. The reward from mutual cooperation is the
blended price (the weighted average of the price of shares tendered and of those ex-
changed in the follow-up merger) of the increased offer; the punishment for mutual
defection is the blended price of the existing offer; the temptation to defect is a larger
share of the tender offer premium as currently offered; and the sucker's payoff is the
price given in the takeout merger.
The game does not describe accurately the situation of shareholders faced with a
tender offer; their payoff matrix is more complex, primarily because the number of play-
ers is greater than two. Consider, for example, the returns for defecting if the pro rata
rule of the Williams Act is in effect. See supra note 8. Shareholders tender hoping that at
least, but no more than, the minimum number of shares requested are also offered,
giving the shareholder his maximum share of the tender offer premium. Interestingly, a
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ally, B's shareholders cannot effectively resist A's offer. In other
words, shareholders who would vote to reject the offer will never-
theless tender. The stampede effect is unique to hostile tender of-
fers; a shareholder who casts a negative vote and who is in the
minority does not necessarily lose the opportunity to tender his
stock once the offer begins. Voting on whether to accept a tender
offer is, therefore, one mechanism for collective shareholder
action.3
6
Failure to unite in response to A's offer may therefore result in
A's purchasing control of B for a twenty percent premium, nullifying
the negotiating power held by even a conscientious and faithful
board. The shareholders must bargain collectively if they are to vin-
dicate their belief, or the belief of their board, that.a higher price is
available. Absent collective action, B's shareholders lose the possi-
bility of sharing in any negotiated premium over the initial twenty
percent offer. They lose the power to enforce a bottom line position
at a thirty percent premium or to bluff to a premium of up to fifty
percent. Thus, the stampede effect diminishes the target share-
holder's ability to bargain for a portion of the potential gain caused
by the new combination of bidder-target. Academic commentators
have often undervalued or even overlooked this effect in their writ-
ings,37 but the business world has not.
person who defects may also hope that not enough others defect to make the tender
offer successful, if he believes the bidder will pay more. Thus, shareholders who tender
hope for an optimal mix of cooperation and defection by other shareholders.
36 Arguably consistent with the position that offers to sell a company, if broken
down to stock values, are decisions in which managers enjoy no particular advantage
over shareholders is the claim that shareholders should be able to vote on hostile tender
offers before an offer is activated. Some state statutes so provide. See infra note 43 and
accompanying text. In other words, an assumption of misbehavior on the part of corpo-
rate managers in control transactions does not itselfjustify a prohibition of all defenses
to hostile tender offers. Cf infra note 39.
37 See generally Coffee, supra note 4; Dennis, supra note 8; Gilson I & II, supra note 4.
Other authors have identified the stampede effect, but in searching for a link be-
tween the effect and inefficient transfers, they have consistently misassessed or narrowed
its social costs. (In an inefficient transfer, gains to bidder and target shareholders are
less than the losses incurred by all shareholders.) Professor Lowenstein, for example,
argues that the stampede effect causes simple value-transfers from the target to the bid-
der by allowing the bidder to exploit temporary depressions in the target's stock price.
Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 274, 291-94. Professor Carney identifies simple value-trans-
fers in two-tiered tender offers that threaten a blended price that is lower than an antici-
pated post-tender offer market price for the stock of a target that has remained
independent. (The blended price comes from the pro rata rule of the Williams Act and is
the weighted average of the tender offer price and the takeout merger price.) Professor
Coffee has fielded convincing rebuttals: he notes that Professor Lowenstein makes some
questionable claims about stock prices, and Professor Carney, although finding an ineffi-
cient transfer, describes an unusual case. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1169-73. Yet, the
stampede effect should not be ignored. The target shareholders will devise measures to
resist it, and the relative efficiency of these devices is a part of the overall equation. See
infrn Part 11.
1985]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
B. Empowering Managers to be Negotiating Agents: The
Optimal Mechanism Collective Shareholder Action?
Currently the business community is undergoing an intense pe-
riod of experimentation, testing a variety of sophisticated tech-
niques for defending against two-tiered tender offers. Many of the
techniques represent illegitimate efforts by managers to protect
their jobs, but many are legitimate, representing instead the efforts
of shareholders and their managers to create mechanisms for a col-
lective response. Shareholders who wish to avoid the stampede ef-
fect can take either of two basic approaches: they can delegate
bargaining authority to a duly empowered agent, or they can create
automatic blocking mechanisms that operate without the participa-
tion of an agent: The automatic mechanisms are inflexible, costly,
or both, and the delegation of bargaining power to an agent creates
agency costs (the risk of faithlessness). At present the trend is for
shareholders to rely primarily on their directors as negotiating
agents, and the methods of empowering them with negotiating au-
thority are varied and complex. This section discusses first the pop-
ular automatic mechanisms and second the use of directors as
negotiating agents.
There are several popular examples of automatic shields
against the stampede effect.38 Most of the devices are commonly
implemented through amendments to corporate charters3 9 and im-
38 Much of the following discussion comes from an excellent treatment by Profes-
sor Carney. See Carney, supra note 4.
39 Some commentators view these charter amendments as suspect because they are
enacted at the instigation of management. The commentators point to management
control over the proxy machinery and argue that management is able to get sharehold-
ers to vote contrary to their own interests. E.g., Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent
Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 822-27
(1982). The argument has disturbing applications; it justifies ignoring shareholder
votes on a wide variety of issues and, in its extreme form, justifies a uniform national
corporate code that guarantees shareholders unwaivable rights. See Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974). But see Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 269 n.20 (1967). Moreover, it
seems contradictory to claim that the same shareholders who will vote against their own
best interests at the behest of managers will choose wisely to sell their stock at the be-
hest of bidders.
The answer to these well-worn arguments is best articulated by Professor Posner:
companies that do not deal fairly with shareholders will have to pay more to attract
investors, and this higher cost of capital will disadvantage the companies in their prod-
uct markets. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 14.1-15.7 (2d ed. 1977). See also
R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 18-28 (1978). Thus, over time it is in
the manager's interest to offer charter amendments that are honestly favored by their
shareholders. Some managers, of course, may choose to manipulate rather than accom-
modate shareholders and, over time, the capital market will exact its penalty. See infra
note 67.
Professor Gilson argues that shareholders vote with management without careful
thought of the consequences because it is not worth the time for any single shareholder
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pede the second-stage takeout merger. The shareholders enact
super-majority provisions for mergers that follow a tender offer.
The acquiring company must offer favorable terms (which usually
means terms substantially equivalent to the tender offer price) in the
second-stage merger to secure the necessary approval from enough
of the minority shareholders to secure approval for the merger. A
second example is a "fair price" amendment that prohibits any
merger subsequent to a tender offer unless the price paid to minor-
ity shareholders is greater than or equal to the tender offer price.40
Other automatic provisions come from federal and state legisla-
tion, presumably enacted at the behest of potential target compa-
nies. The legislation is arguably a substitute for provisions that
target shareholders would themselves put in the articles of their cor-
porations if they met and agreed on a mechanism for coordinating a
response to a two-tiered tender offer. Thus, for example, one could
justify the twenty business day minimum offering period provided
under the Williams Act as a substitute for an agreement among all
target shareholders not to tender for twenty days in response to any
tender offer so as to give other bidders notice and time to make
higher bids. 4' One can argue similarly in justification for some of
to inform herself properly. Because no single shareholder can fully claim the gains of
any individual research effort, each shareholder waits hoping to free ride on the efforts
of others, and shareholder resistance to management proposals is systematically un-
derfunded. Gilson, supra. Gilson overlooks, however, the incentive of the larger inves-
tors to monitor their investments, and if they disagree with management's treatment of
shareholders, they can adversely affect the price of the stock. Thus, a large minority
vote may give faithless managers only a temporary victory: the amendment may pass,
but the vote indicates a substantial dissent that may translate into lower stock prices. It
is no surprise, therefore, that large minority votes are often effective at changing corpo-
rate policies.
In this regard one study has found that the announcement of shark repellent
amendments correlates with a rise in stock prices. Linn & McConnell, An Empirical Inves-
tigation of the Impact of "Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices, I1 J. FIN. EcoN.
361 (1983). See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 3, at 208-09 ("As an initial
matter, if a defensive tactic is explicitly adopted or sanctioned by the corporation's
shareholders, it should not be considered abusive, regardless of the extent to which it
might deter takeovers . .. . They have strong incentives to adopt whatever defensive
measures they believe will maximize the value of the corporation's shares.") There is
some contrary evidence based on a general survey of institutional investors; the inves-
tors opposed supermajority amendments and were split on the value of fair price
amendments. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1181 n.101, 1189 n.126. The value of general
survey information, however, is questionable in light of the importance of the specific
target company's particular position to such decisions. The survey itself reflects this; the
split on fair price amendments changed with the size of the target company. Id.
40 Many fair price amendments are much more complicated and set the price
through a formula based on prior market prices, tender offer prices, or even some form
of price-earnings ratio related to earlier ratios.
41 Interestingly, this approach to the Williams Act implies that corporations should
be able to opt out of the Act's protections. Several of the state statutory protections can
be waived. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83 1(a) (Page 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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the state statutory provisions.42 Ohio and Wisconsin statutes, 43 for
example, require, among other things, a majority vote of the share-
holders (excluding any shares held by a bidder) before any tender
offer for over a defined number of shares can be executed. The pro-
visions are a substitute for a collective agreement not to tender un-
less a majority of the target shareholders vote to do so.4 4 -this is not
to say that either of these provisions is sound, but rather to say that
each can be justified with an appropriate factual foundation.45 The
value of the legislative provisions is in saved transaction costs; a uni-
form rule avoids some of the need for individual corporate charter
amendments on the matter.
46
15, § 1910a (Purdon 1984); 1983-85 Wis. LEGIS. SERV. 200, § 7 (West). If the Williams
Act is too protective, corporations could choose to opt out in favor of less protective
provisions. Indeed, there is a stronger argument for allowing corporations to opt out of
the Williams Act than for allowing corporations to increase the protections of the Act (as
they can now), for managers are more likely to act selfishly in the latter instance than the
former.
42 Ideally, the federal government would defer entirely to the states on the matter
of tender offer legislation; corporations could choose to incorporate in the state with
legislation that provides them with the best tender offer regulations, and each state
would be encouraged to develop legislation that best reflects shareholder interests. See
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, supra note 3, at 215-16. But the states have shown a
propensity to do more than model shareholder desires; they have a history of using
takeover legislation to protect their tax base and local jobs. See Dennis, supra note 8, at
296-303; Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83
MICH. L. REV. 433 (1984).
43 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(e)(1) (Page 1983); 1983-85 Wis. LEGIS. SERV.
200, § 7 (West).
44 The argument also provides an answer to the concerns of the majority of the
Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), where five Justices held
that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. The Justices noted the nationwide effect of the legislation (corporations
with minimal contacts with Illinois were included) and were unable to find a strong tar-
get shareholder interest in the statute. They noted that the statute was designed to keep
local businesses independent by obstructing tender offers. A statute that minimizes the
extraterritorial effects and serves the interests of target shareholders in providing a col-
lective response to tender offers might pass muster. Unfortunately, the language of
some of the opinions that constitute the majority is very broad and may foreclose the
argument.
Separate pluralities of the Court would have voided the Illinois act as a direct re-
straint on interstate commerce and as preempted by the Williams Act under the
supremacy clause. Neither position can be satisfied by redrafting state takeover legisla-
tion; if either becomes acceptable to a majority of the Justices there will be a complete
bar on state takeover acts. See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, No. 85-1640 (6th Cir. Aug.
26, 1985) (Michigan Take-Over Offers Act preempted by Williams Act).
45 Some states have also enacted "fair price" and "super-majority" provisions that
are similar to the fair price charter and super majority voting amendments noted in the
previous paragraph. E.g., MD. CORPS. & AssN's. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp.
1984). Cf. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C)(l)-(3), 1910 (Purdon 1984-
85 Supp.) (restricts voting of "interested shareholders" in second stage mergers; disin-
terested shareholders have special redemption rights).
46 Of course, if the legislation is out of step with shareholder preferences, it is
wasteful. If the legislation provides inadequate protections, shareholders will continue
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Automatic defenses are inflexible, however, and this is a sub-
stantial disadvantage. They discourage bidders that target share-
holders may want to accommodate and leave no room for effective
bargaining with those bidders that appear. The flexibility to enter-
tain all offers and yet resist the insufficient ones can come only
through the use of a bargaining agent. But how do shareholders
empower such an agent? The most obvious method is through
stock resale restrictions, contingent on the occurrence of a tender
offer.
For example, the shareholders could agree to vest in the hands
of an identified agent the exclusive right to tender stock in the event
any tender offer is announced for more than a specified percentage
of the stock, with the shareholders retaining the right to sell to any-
one but the offeror during the period of the tender offer. The agent
would then have the power to negotiate for the best price with the
original bidder and to find other bidders to stimulate an auction.
The right not to tender could also be vested exclusively in the agent
or reserved to the shareholders enabling them to refuse to tender
even though their agent recommends that they tender. In either
case, however, the agent must agree to the price for the tender offer
to proceed. The agent could be constrained, if desired, by some
pre-established limits on his bargaining authority.4 7 The major na-
tional stock exchanges do not favor resale transfer restrictions on
securities, however, and stock subject to these company-wide con-
tingent resale restrictions may not qualify to be traded on the
exchanges. 4
8
Less direct mechanisms for coordination that do not involve re-
sale restrictions are available. Indeed, many corporations have en-
acted them.49 These mechanisms depend on an obstruction of the
to seek corporation by corporation solutions. If the legislation provides too much pro-
tection, shareholders will opt out, if possible. If they cannot opt out, overall stock prices
will drop to reflect the legislation's inefficiency. This method of evaluating legislation on
corporate governance is not new. See R. POSNER, supra note 39, § 14.3.
47 Shareholders, worried about the loyalty of such agents, could theoretically agree
to be bound by blanket prohibitions on tendering to certain kinds of offers, such as
offers for less than a specified percentage of stock or for less than a specified premium
over market value.
48 The New York Stock Exchange does not expressly prohibit this kind of resale
restriction, but it does disfavor several similar restrictions. The Exchange has an ongo-
ing "concern" with tactics that discriminate against "anyone seeking to make a substan-
tial investment" in a company. The Exchange also finds objectionable "right of first
refusal" provisions, certain "call" provisions, and irrevocable proxies. NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 3-4 (1983). Because large publicly held companies
depend on the liquidity of the exchanges to aid them in raising capital, exchange listing
requirements are powerful standards. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1255-69 (suggesting use
of exchange rules to control target management misbehavior).
49 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1183.
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second stage of the two-tiered tender offer-the takeout merger.
The mechanism that best approximates the straight delegation of
authority to negotiate the terms of a sale to an agent is a charter
amendment imposing super-majority shareholder voting require-
ments (ninety to ninety-five percent) on mergers that can .be waived
by an incumbent board of directors. If the super-majority require-
ments are set high enough, a negotiated waiver is the only practical
method of acquiring full ownership. This leaves the incumbent
board with some flexibility to condition its waiver on a satisfactory
price in either or both the terms of the tender offer or the terms of
the second-stage merger.50
Assume that shareholders have not gathered together before-
hand to discuss and implement special options that consolidate their
bargaining position, or they have met and decided to give their
managers the broadest possible delegation of authority ("do what is
best for us"). When confronted with a tender offer, how can gener-
ally empowered target managers act as bargaining agents? They are
neither appointed to be the exclusive sales agent for a controlling
block of shareholders, nor do they have the power to waive an auto-
matic blocking provision such as a super-majority charter amend-
ment. Instead, target managers must devise other techniques for
stalling tender offers in order both to search for alternate buyers
and to negotiate for the best price with the initial bidder. However,
the tactics which they employ to stall a tender offer should be revers-
ible so that managers can remove them once they reach an agree-
ment with a bidder on appropriate tender offer terms. In this
manner, tactics that have been universally condemned by commen-
tators can, if used properly, be justified as advancing the best interests
of the target shareholders. 51 The crucial issues, therefore, are
50 Presumably the passivity thesis would prohibit this tactic unless the agent with
power to waive the requirement was not a controlling official of the target.
51 The only case to discuss a target management's argument for creating a tempo-
rary block to a tender offer is Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.
1984). The target company argued that a newly founded employee stock option plan
(ESOP) was needed to consolidate voting control "to 'buy' time to explore financial
alternatives to a Piezo takeover." Id. at 267. The target managers had allocated target
stock to the ESOP, in which the target managers were installed as trustees. Thus, the
target managers controlled the ESOP's decision to tender once a tender offer was an-
nounced. Giving a substantial block of stock to an ESOP, therefore, is a classic revers-
ible defensive tactic. The court's response was outrage.
We have never given the slightest indication that we would sanction a
board decision to lock up voting power by any means, for as long as the
directors deem necessary, prior to making the decisions that will deter-
mine a corporation's destiny. Were we to countenance that, we would in
effect be approving a wholesale wresting of corporate power from the
hands of the shareholders, to whom it is entrusted by statute, and into the
hands of the officers and directors.
Id. Of course, any effort by shareholders to collectively empower a negotiating agent is
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whether a defensive tactic is reversible and how a tactic is used in
any given case.
52
The target company's purchase of a third company that is a pri-
mary competitor of the bidder in one of the bidder's product mar-
kets is an example of a reversible tactic that managers may employ
in the shareholders' best interests. The target company's purchase
will block the tender offer because of the merger restrictions con-
tained in antitrust legislation. 53 This tactic is reversible because the
target management can sell the newly acquired business. 54 Thus,
the tactic gives the target time to find a higher bidder or to negotiate
for a higher price from the first bidder. However, if another bidder
makes an offer and the tactic is used to discourage the initial bidder
from making a counteroffer, its use becomes illegitimate because it
favors one bidder over another. 55 Moreover, the tactic is often ille-
gitimate if it is used to defeat a tender offer by a single bidder. If
target management loses the sole bidder by demanding clearly un-
acceptable acquisition terms, it either has bargained poorly or has
pursued its own interests at the expense of its shareholders.
Litigation by the target against the initial bidder is another re-
versible defense; the target can drop the lawsuit once the bargain is
made. A recent study on target litigation by Gregg Jarrell demon-
strates the value of this reversible defense.56 By using litigation, the
target hopes to stall a tender offer long enough to encourage new
bidders or gain bargaining leverage against the current bidder. The
target typically alleges securities and antitrust violations and other
forms of fraud against the bidder (usually without good prospects of
winning on the merits). Jarrell found that in over seventy-five per-
cent of the cases, litigious targets significantly increased the take-
over premium either by encouraging competitive bidding or by
necessarily a change of power. But this delegation of power is not itself evil; it is the use
of the power that determines culpability. The holding undoubtedly was influenced
heavily by facts indicating that the target managers resisted the bidder solely to perpetu-
ate themselves in office. Id. at 266-67.
52 See infra part III.
53 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981) (af-
firming preliminary enjoinment of acquisition of Marathon Oil by Mobil because of
"strong probability" that proposed acquisition violates antitrust laws), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982).
54 The tactic has two pitfalls: First, the target managers must not, reflecting their
desperation, buy high and sell low. Second, the bidder may be able to avoid antitrust
problems by promising to sell the new business immediately upon acquiring control. If
courts accept such a promise as a complete defense to injunctive relief, the tactic fails.
55 For a proposal on how courts should treat defensive tactics that favor one bid-
der, see infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
56 Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation By Targets: Do Interests Diverge In a Merger?, 28
J.L. & ECON. 151 (1985). The defense may be infirm on other grounds, however, be-
cause it is arguably a misuse ofjudicial process. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS
§ 682 (1972).
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sweetening the offers from the only suitor. 57 Auctions therefore oc-
curred more frequently for litigious than nonlitigious targets, and
these auctions increased takeover premiums by an average of seven-
teen percent.58 Jarrell also inferred that many targets who defeated
takeovers by vigorous litigation, losing the entire takeover premium,
did so unintentionally and that in such cases the targets took a gam-
ble that may have been sensible under the circumstances. 59
C. The Risks of Relying on Target Managers as
Negotiating Agents
The need for flexibility in responding to a tender offer and the
high cost of obtaining contemporaneous directions from sharehold-
ers imply that the optimal choice for collective action consists of
electing a generally empowered negotiating agent. The optimal sys-
tem would seem to be one that ties agents' rewards exclusively to
their success in the negotiation. For example, an agent who is not a
member of the target's management team could be appointed as
special outside director. This special director could have the dele-
gated responsibility of negotiating for the highest tender offer price.
The best way to empower such an agent with negotiating authority
is to grant him the exclusive right to approve tender offers for share-
holders, that is, the right to prohibit shareholders from tendering to
an offeror. Compensation could be tied to stock price increases re-
sulting from his acts in response to a tender offer.
This method of compensation would eliminate much of the
conflict of interest that results when target managers respond to a
tender offer. The special director, of course, may lose his job upon
completion of a tender offer, but he realizes no gain by defeating a
tender offer unless the post tender offer stock price exceeds the
weighted average of the tender offer price and the anticipated sec-
ond-stage merger price. Moreover, the special director's reputation
as a negotiating agent, which could earn him opportunities to act in
a similar capacity for other companies, depends on his success in
negotiating the best price. Unfortunately, the creation of specially
compensated and empowered directorships has never received seri-
ous consideration. Yet, it is the only system that courts should
judge under the business judgment rule.
60
Without stock resale restrictions, the only way to empower di-
rectly a general negotiating agent is to grant target managers the
authority to block or stall tender offers with a range of tactics based
57 Id. at 174.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See infra text accompanying notes 94-100.
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on their ability to strategically manipulate corporate affairs. Of
course, target managers who block or stall a tender offer may misbe-
have in order to keep their jobs or obtain other side-payments (such
as bribes from one of the interested parties). Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel, suspicious of the bona fide intentions of corpo-
rate managers, imply that corporate managers are largely incapable
of acting as faithful bargaining agents in this setting. This belief in-
fects other coordination devices as well. They argue that legal rules,
such as the Williams Act, that are designed to aid shareholders just
provide additional room for the maneuvers of self-serving manag-
ers.6 1 Moreover, they assert that provisions in corporate charters,
which shareholders ratify ostensibly to coordinate their actions,
originate from managers who seek to protect their own job interests
through their control of the corporate proxy machinery. 62 Thus,
the only shareholder coordination mechanism that would pass mus-
ter under the passivity thesis is one that shareholders propose and
ratify with no support or aid from the company's managers.63
A shareholder-initiated coordination agreement will occur in-
frequently, if at all, because individual shareholder apathy is a ra-
tional response. No single shareholder can realize fully the gain that
results from a coordination agreement. Each shareholder will there-
fore sit back and hope to free ride on the efforts of others. No
shareholder will incur the costs that it would be rational for all
shareholders collectively to expend. In addition, a shareholder
would bear relatively large organizational costs in creating such an
agreement, compared with the gain on that shareholder's stock that
the agreement would generate. Because no generally available
mechanism exists to prorate the costs outside of relying on manage-
ment, shareholder coordination in publicly-held corporations will
be systematically underfunded. Thus, target managers must often
take the lead in organizing shareholders to prepare for a collective
response.
The frequency of misbehavior by managers confronting the
prospect of a hostile tender offer is an empirical question, and no
convincing study analyzes a large number of tender offers to assess
61 See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1162-63, 1169-70; Easterbrook &
Fischel III, supra note 1, at 16-17, 21; see also Easterbrook &Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From
Defeating Tender Offers., 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 279 n.6 (1984). Cf. Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 25, at 336-40 (recommending legislation aimed at eliminating undesir-
able effects of two-tiered tender offer).
62 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1201.
63 The justifications for the passivity thesis, considered infra Part II, seem to require
that even shareholder-initiated coordination mechanisms be prohibited. Although
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel write as if the thesis acts solely on corporate manag-
ers, it also may apply to shareholder acts that disadvantage the first bidder or raise
tender offer prices.
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the effect of defensive tactics by target management.64 Although
some cases show that the intervention of target managers has en-
hanced the shareholders' gain,65 other cases indicate that such inter-
vention has reduced shareholders' gain.66 Even in these latter cases,
however, the target managers may have taken a justifiable gamble to
increase the tender offer price. A straightforward application of the
efficient capital market model suggests that firms run by managers
who misbehave when confronted with tender offers will be penal-
ized over time in the capital markets, and, therefore, that only firms
run by managers who act properly in the face of a hostile tender
offer will survive over time.
67
Whatever the frequency of target management misbehavior, a
significant portion of such behavior results from the failure of the
state courts and legislatures to define a proper role for target man-
agers. This failure is correctable. 68 It is harsh to criticize target
managers for engaging in acts that are declared legal, even though
the acts are self-serving. In sum, Professors Easterbrook and Fis-
chel have not made a convincing case for their passivity thesis as a
bright line rule that errs on the side of excessive enforcement; target
management misbehavior is neither so frequent nor so difficult to
64 Many studies suggest that shareholders of the target gain substantially from suc-
cessful tender offers, see Dennis, supra note 8, at 317-18 & n.175, but no thorough study
of whether the defensive tactics of the target management increase or decrease the gain
exists. The best data seem to be injarrell's study. See supra text accompanying notes 56-
59.
The studies of firms whose managers completely defeated takeover bids offer am-
biguous and conflicting information. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 61, at
281-82 (noting conflicting results in studies based on direct price comparisons of finan-
cial economists). But see Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibil-
ities: An Update, ABA INST. ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CONTROL (Dec. 8, 1983)
(citing study by Kidder, Peabody & Company finding that in over 50% of the cases,
target shareholders benefited from the defeat of tender offer).
65 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 1175 n.79 (noting several examples of competi-
tive auctions stimulated by target management driving up the tender offer premium).
But see Easterbrook & Fischel III, supra note 1, at 7 n.16 (questioning causal connection
between management-stimulated auctions and increased premiums).
66 Easterbrook &Jarrell, supra note 61, at 282-91.
67 The model posits that the share price of a corporation reflects all public informa-
tion on the prospects of that corporation. See, e.g., Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-81
(1984); Barry, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307,
1315-19, 1330-54 (1981). If target management consistently misbehaves in anticipation
of or during hostile tender offers, the share price of the firm presumably will drop to
reflect the shareholder's lost opportunity to secure a tender offer premium. The drop in
price will make raising additional capital more expensive for the firm. This result makes
it more expensive for the firm to compete and expand. Moreover, if the price drops low
enough, it may become worthwhile for an acquirer to spend the sum necessary to over-
come the resistance of the target management.
68 See infra part III. But see Coffee, supra note 4, at 1251 (asserting that failure of
state courts and legislatures to define proper role for target managers is incorrectable).
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penalize effectively that the judiciary, with a mature case law on the
issue, cannot control it.
II
THE AGENCY COSTS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
PASSIVITY RULE
As noted earlier, the second justification that Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel advance for the passivity thesis is an argument
based on maximizing the ex ante position of shareholders by reduc-
ing agency costs. 69 Admitting for the sake of argument that target
shareholders can and do benefit from some acts undertaken by their
managers after a tender offer is announced, specifically their efforts
to stimulate a competitive bidding market, they argue that this gain
is largely unimportant to an investor's ex ante perspective, that is,
his welfare considered at a time before the commencement of the
offer. They claim that legal rules that increase the frequency of
tender offers will lead to better management (or in the economists'
terms reduce agency costs) because poor managers will more often
lose their positions. 70 All managers who want to stay employed will
have an enhanced incentive to maximize the value of their company,
and thus the company's stock, which translates into an increase in
the total ex ante wealth of all shareholders.
The second argument needs to be distinguished carefully from
the first; otherwise, both positions tend to intermingle and provide
false support for each other when neither can stand on its own. Mis-
takes or self-serving acts by target managers defending tender offers
raise the price and discourage potential bidders, thus creating the ex
ante effect of decreasing the monitoring efficacy of tender offers.
Eliminating this misbehavior will increase the ex ante wealth of all
shareholders; but this is apparently not enough. Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel want to minimize the legitimate gains made by
target shareholders from tender offers in order to entice a maximum
number of potential offerors. Bargain prices lure more customers.
In theory, therefore, the passivity thesis prohibits a target's
management from maximizing gains to their own shareholders ex
post in order to benefit all shareholders ex ante. In essence, target
managers who act to drive up tender offer prices to benefit their
own shareholders impose costs on all shareholders (measured by
the lost ex ante reduction in agency costs) who are external to the
corporation. These external costs are similar in nature to the exter-
nal costs imposed on the public by a corporate official who saves
69 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1174-80.
70 Id. at 1174.
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costs for his shareholders by polluting the air or water. Although
the external costs of pollution are easy to see, the external costs of
defensive tactics by target managers are more obscure.
Apparent losses suffered by target shareholders who do not re-
alize the maximum price for their stock are disregarded. According
to the ex ante argument, these ex post losses are irrelevant to the ex
ante calculation. Because these ex post losses of target shareholders
will constitute corresponding ex post gains to bidders, the transfer
of value effected by the passivity rule from target shareholders to
bidders creates no net ex ante loss that offsets any part of the ex
ante gains realized from reduced agency costs. A separate and more
controversial claim is that there will be no discernible group who
will be ex ante losers when the passivity rule takes effect.7 1
The ex ante argument on agency costs represents a significant
addition to current thought on the role of target managers in tender
offers, but the passivity rule may not provide the sizable ex ante
gains that Professors Easterbrook and Fischel theorize. Professor
Coffee and others have questioned whether the rule will encourage
more inefficient than efficient mergers (or enough inefficient merg-
ers with substantial costs so that losses from these takeovers exceed
the gains from the additional efficient takeovers).72 More funda-
mentally in doubt, however, is whether the rule will stimulate a sig-
nificant number of additional takeovers, however typed. Moreover,
71 Shareholders in companies that have a high probability of being future targets
will bear the brunt of the losses created by the enactment of the rule unless they are
diversified and also hold offsetting positions in companies that have a high probability of
being future bidders. The potential ex post loss in the value of stock in potential targets
translates into an ex ante loss to an identifiable group, offset by an ex ante gain realized
by shareholders in potential bidders. At issue, therefore, is whether one can identify
high probability targets and high probability bidders on the day the passivity rule takes
effect. Compare Bebchuk I, supra note 4, at 1038; Bebchuk II, supra note 4, at 42-43 (yes)
with Easterbrook & Fischel III, supra note 1, at 7-9 (no).
72 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1206-07. That hostile tender offers do in fact, or will
once the passivity rule is adopted, displace inefficient management frequently enough to
have a disciplinary effect is crucial to the argument. Several authors have noted that
tender offers are often motivated by other interests. See, e.g, Bebchuk I, supra note 4, at
1030-34 (motive may be "synergistic gains," information that target stock is underval-
ued, or prospect of expanding size of enterprise); Coffee, supra note 4, at 1207 (noting
that bidders pursue well-managed companies at least as often as they pursue misman-
aged companies). Some data supports their observations. A management consultant
firm found that of 58 major acquisition programs undertaken between 1972 and 1983,
28 were failures. Do Mergers Really Work?, Bus. WEEK, June 3, 1985, at 88. In most of the
success stories, the management of the target stayed on to run the business. Moreover,
the average return to bidders on tender offers is only some nine to eleven percent. See
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 3, at 197. This figure seems below what most
managers would demand from other investments that have an equivalent high risk of
failure. At issue, therefore, is what kind of tender offers a rule that favors bidders will
encourage.
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the rule may have costs that Professors Easterbrook and Fischel
have omitted from their ex ante calculations.
A. The Incentive to Make a Tender Offer for Inefficiently
Run Targets
1. The Passivity Rule's Effect on the Tender Offer Price
The argument that defensive tactics decrease shareholders ex
ante wealth rests on two factual assumptions. First, even assuming
that target manager misbehavior is stamped out, the acts of target
managers who increase the tender offer price discourage a signifi-
cant number of bidders who would otherwise bid for inefficiently
run companies. Second, the passivity rule will disable target manag-
ers from increasing the tender offer price, thus significantly increas-
ing the incentive of potential bidders to find inefficiently run targets
in order to make a profit. The first factual assertion seems correct,
although some commentators do take issue with aspects of it. 73 The
second assertion, however, is problematic. At issue is the size of the
effect that the passivity rule will have on tender offer prices and on
bidders' incentives.
The passivity thesis disables shareholders from responding col-
lectively to offers through target managers. Its purpose is to re-
strain artificially the price of target shareholders' stock by
constraining the bargaining ability of target companies. 74 More di-
rect restraints that are similar in effect to the passivity rule would be
universally condemned as confiscatory; for example, once any po-
tential acquiring company offers target shareholders a twenty per-
cent premium over market price, the shareholders must sell.
Indeed, the passivity rule has a confiscatory tone to it that has dis-
turbing extensions. 75 In any event, the effect of this artificial con-
73 Both Professors Gilson and Bebchuk have argued that allowing target managers
to seek competitive bidders, for example, will not dampen the willingness of the first
bidder because the first bidder can turn a quick profit even if its tender offer fails by
tendering its shares to the winning bidder. Bebchuk I, supra note 4, at 1030, 1034-38;
Gilson II, supra note 4, at 868-75. If the first bidder has acquired the shares at pre-
tender offer prices, its profits can be substantial. Examples are not hard to find. In early
1984, Texas International Airlines, Inc. lost a bidding war for control of National Air-
lines but sold its National Airlines stock to the eventual winner, Pan American, for a
profit of $47 million.
74 Professor Coffee terms the passivity rule a "zero takeover premium policy" be-
cause the rule enables bidders to mount successful tender offers at small premiums over
the existing market price. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1164-65.
75 In hypothetical case one in the previous section, see supra text accompanying
notes 20-26, suppose that X has reason to legitimately suspect that A will pay more than
a 20% premium for B because A is capable of using B's assets to generate a considerable
gain. Moreover, she suspects that if she tells other potential buyers about A's interest,
she can stimulate an auction to maximize her family's gain. Should we impose an arbi-
trary rule on X that prohibits her from bargaining to sell at anything significantly over
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straint on bargaining is likely to be the proliferation of techniques
designed to avoid the consequences of the rule.
The passivity rule operates on ex post behavior. An investor
may not be able to predict which companies will become targets, 76
but once he becomes subject to a loss as a target shareholder, he
will take steps to avoid it. Even a fully diversified investor may not
be free from the pressure to gain an ex post dollar. He will en-
courage target managers to increase a tender offer premium if he
does not own an offsetting position in the bidder. He does so hop-
ing shareholders in other targets will not, for if all other targets act
similarly to increase tender offer premiums, he loses ex ante on his
other stocks; it is a classic prisoner's dilemma. 77 The passivity rule
attempts to prohibit targets from maximizing their ex post position.
Yet there are three leaks in the rule that operate to restrict tar-
get managers once a tender offer is announced. First, an investor
will encourage target managers to monitor investor activity and in-
stall defenses before a tender offer is announced, that is, once a
tender offer appears likely. The definition of a tender offer an-
nouncement under the passivity rule will, of course, occupy courts.
Second, if there are enough potential bidders that are largely identi-
fiable in advance (companies like Mesa Petroleum develop an exper-
tise in tender offers and mount a substantial percentage of current
tender offers; repeat players are therefore common), and if, as is
currently the case, most investors do not include stocks in these re-
peat players in their portfolios, most investors will encourage man-
agers to install defenses even when the likelihood of a tender offer
appears relatively remote. Third, investors will seek to empower ne-
gotiating agents that can operate for their collective interests after a
tender offer is announced, by using agents that are not classified as
target managers. Courts will be confronted with the question of
whether all shareholder agents should be subject to the passivity
existing market prices? A has sunk costs in finding B, and those costs create social gains
with the combination of A and B. If X is an excellent bargainer and A is a poor bar-
gainer, or ifA is simply outbid by the appearance of a new buyer (who free rides on A's
search), A may not recover those costs. To encourage A's to buy B's should we therefore
establish rules which favor A's in the bargaining?
76 The market price of any stock will reflect all available information on the likeli-
hood that a company will be a takeover target. Thus, unless an investor has inside,
nonpublic information, he cannot rationally decide that a stock price is low in light of
the potential of a tender offer. An investor must make his true investment decisions in
the ex ante position, and his ex post position is a product of chance.
77 See supra note 35. The cooperative outcome for all diversified investors who hold
stock in a specific target is to not act to increase tender offer premiums so as to increase
everyone's ex ante gain from reduced agency costs; defectors act to increase tender offer
premiums hoping others will not. The inevitable result is the worse result: all investors
who hold target stock increase tender offer premiums and incur the higher agency costs.
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rule and, if so, with the definition of a shareholder agent in this
context.
Such avoidance behavior will drive investors to use cruder and
more costly defensive techniques. The substitutes for managerial
discretion must operate automatically and may be less efficient be-
cause they may discourage offers that could lead to mutually benefi-
cial negotiation between the bidder and target. More potential
targets may turn to the use of shark repellent amendments or con-
tingent share conversion rights plans.78 If lawmakers seek to close
these leaks in the rule, a prohibition of defensive acts by target man-
agers after tender offers are announced will inevitably expand into a
prohibition of all defensive acts by managers or shareholders. In
the end courts will be mired in debates over, for example, whether
management intended the creation of two classes of common stock
to discourage takeovers or to further a legitimate business func-
tion.79 If lawmakers leave the leaks, investors and target managers
will continue to defend against tender offers, but by using more
costly devices.
Even acts that fall clearly within the scope of the passivity rule,
acts by managers after tenders offers have been announced, may
pose troublesome issues for courts. Target managers will have an
incentive to cheat on the rule by notifying other potential bidders
after a tender offer is announced or by effecting some change in the
corporate structure in the name of routine business. The methods
of cheating can be subtle, and the courts will have to struggle with
management's motives to determine whether the passivity rule has
been violated.80 For example, target managers could make strategic
public disclosures of valuable information concerning corporate af-
fairs in order to entice other bidders. The courts would then have
to determine whether such disclosures served legitimate business
purposes beyond blocking the existing tender offer.
Attempts to circumvent the passivity rule either by acts just
outside its boundaries or by disguised violations are the inevitable
response of citizens to government price restraints. In sum, the pas-
sivity rule will be largely ineffectual because target managers and
shareholders will find ways to beat it.
78 A common example is a convertible preferred stock dividend plan. See infra
notes 125-30.
79 See Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 64, at 1415-16 (discussing "super-voting"
common stock).
80 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel chide Professors Bebchuk and Gilson for al-
lowing neutral auctioneering, arguing that disguised resistance is inevitable. Easter-
brook & Fischel III, supra note 1, at 15 n.33.
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2. The Passivity Rule's Protection of First Bidders
Increased protection of the first bidder lies at the core of the ex
ante argument. If bidders who incur the costs of discovering inef-
ficiently managed firms are consistently outbid by others who free
ride on the first bidder's efforts, firms will underinvest in such
searches, with the result that efficiency-gaining tender offers will not
be pursued.8 1 The passivity thesis protects such bidders by enabling
them to mount tender offers that are completed before other poten-
tial bidders can make competing bids. 82 Proponents of the passivity
rule argue that under these circumstances first bidders will usually
prevail, allowing them to realize the maximum return on their
search costs.
In practice, however, the kind of protection the passivity rule
affords the first bidder may be less than complete. Reaching the
shareholders of a widely-held corporation with a public tender offer
requires some time, and if the benefits of free riding are significant,
attentive competitors may find it worthwhile to respond quickly with
higher bids. Indeed, a target's management may itself bid for the
stock.8
3
In some instances, the passivity rule may actually discourage
the initial tender offer. This result may occur when a corporation
tenders for a second corporation with the intention of selling its as-
sets to a third. For example, suppose A is a widely-held company
that tenders successfully for B with the hope of negotiating a sale of
B's assets to C. Upon learning ofA's tender offer, C could tender for
A to obtain B's assets, rather than negotiate with A for a resale be-
cause A's shareholders can no better coordinate a response to C's
offer than B's shareholders can coordinate a response to A's offer.
Because C's tender for A largely eliminates A's return on its tender
for B, the managers and shareholders of A may have no greater in-
81 Professor Gilson downplays the free rider phenomenon, arguing that first bid-
ders often profit handsomely by selling the stock they have acquired in the target to the
winning bidder. Gilson I, supra note 4, at 53-62; Gilson II, supra note 4, at 870-71. In
rebuttal, Professor Coffee notes that a substantial risk exists that first bidders will be
unable to realize this quick turnaround profit because of the mechanics of the winning
bidder's tender offer or because of the securities laws. Professor Coffee also notes that a
recent study reveals that a bidder's own stock significantly declines in value after losing a
bidding contest. Coffee, supra note 4, at 1177-78. Cf. Unocal-Pickens Aftermath, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1985, at DI, col. 3 (T. Boone Pickens, excluded from target's distribu-
tion of assets to shareholders, may lose $20 million).
82 One study found that currently a first bidder loses in the face of competing bids
in 76% of the cases. Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Marketfor Corporate Acquisitions, 11
J. FIN. ECON. 141 (1983).
83 Coffee, supra note 4, at 1195-98 (discussing leveraged buy-outs by management).
Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (target made ex-
change offer for its own shares).
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centive to tender for B under the passivity rule than under current
rules. Indeed, a tender offer by A may serve as a signal to the mar-
ket that A should be a target for a tender offer by any company that
believes it can better use B's assets.8 4 A, without participating in an
auction, can never be sure it is the highest valued user of the assets
of B and therefore can never be sure that a C is not lurking some-
where in the market.
Finally, even if the passivity rule does protect first bidders, it is
a crude approximation of the ideal system. Other approximations
may be more appropriate. The ideal system (assuming no transac-
tion costs) for rewarding first bidders who gather or otherwise pay
for valuable information identifying potential takeover targets
would require a mandatory transfer payment to the first bidder from
all subsequent bidders who use the information, regardless of which
bidder wins the auction. All firms using the information would inte-
grate its costs into their calculations of whether to bid and at what
price. A rule requiring transfer payments would be impracticable,
however, because of the problems of valuing the first bidder's infor-
mation and of assessing whether the first bidder's research primarily
motivated subsequent bidders to enter the market. For example,
tender offers often come in waves in one industry, suggesting that
some first bidders free ride off each other.
The passivity thesis, however, may not be the best alternative.
Other schemes exist which do not carry the disadvantage of prevent-
ing the target shareholders from selling to the highest bidder. For
example, all subsequent bidders in a tender offer auction could be
required to make pro rata payments to the first bidder that approxi-
mate the first bidder's search costs. The payments depend on the
difference between the initial bidder's first bid and its last bid.
8 5 If
the bid is lost, any profits made on the sale of target stock bought in
anticipation of the tender offer should be subtracted from this pay-
ment. This program needs a considerable degree of fine tuning to
be workable and is probably politically infeasible, but it illustrates
84 Companies like Mesa Petroleum that are career bidders typically have some of
the most "bullet proof" takeover defenses.
85 This rule approximates the optimal system by using the first bidder's bids to
estimate its search costs. It assumes that a first bidder's initial bid is its bottom line price
for making an appropriate rate of return on its total investment, which includes its sunk
research costs. If the first bidder must meet competitive bidders, then the first bidder's
highest bid in response will not include a return on its sunk costs. Ideally, therefore, the
difference between a first bidder's first bid and its last bid will approximate an appropri-
ate rate of return on its search costs.
The rule has numerous problems. First bidders under such a system will start low
to maximize their payments. Moreover, the last bid of a losing first bidder may, because
of the mechanics of the bidding, also be too low. For example, what does one do when
the second bidder's first bid is too high for the first bidder to respond at all?
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the range of alternatives to the passivity rule and sheds light on the
nature of the rule itself.
8 6
B. The Costs of the Passivity Rule
The passivity rule has significant costs. Two types of costs were
mentioned in Section A above, but the rule creates other significant
costs as well. First, target managers and shareholders will use less
efficient methods of collective activity to strengthen their bargaining
position, and, second, the rule requires a series of control transac-
tions to get target assets into the hands of the highest potential bid-
der in the market.87 Third, the rule favors institutional and other
large investors and makes it impractical for small investors to hold
stock directly in companies that may be targets. Fourth, the rule, in
decreasing the number of negotiated mergers, decreases the joint
gains that negotiation itself can often create.
If the passivity rule is enacted and the Williams Act repealed,
bidders will return to the "Saturday Night Special" and other short-
lived offers with no pro rata acceptance contingency for oversub-
scriptions. Once such a tender offer is announced, small investors,
who do not have enough at stake to justify constant market vigi-
lance, will invariably lose the race to tender, making direct share-
holding by small investors more risky. Small investors will thus be
encouraged to invest in mutual funds or other intermediaries and
the large publicly held companies will lose small stake holders.
Even investments in financial intermediaries are not free from com-
plications, however, as tender offers can be made for the in-
termediaries themselves as well, and large scale investors in the
intermediaries will have an advantage. In sum, the stock market
86 This overt transfer payment scheme offers several advantages over the passivity
thesis. The target shareholders are not put under such extraordinary pressure to tender
immediately. Indeed, a transfer payment system could retain most of the current slow-
down provisions of the Williams Act. Target shareholders also would have the opportu-
nity to sell to the highest bidder in the market, minimizing the number of transfers nec-
essary to get the target company's assets to the most efficient user. In addition, bidders
who otherwise would free ride on the first bidder's information can be assessed directly.
Finally, target management continue in their customary role as agents acting to maxi-
mize the shareholders' gain. In sum, these advantages reduce feelings of exploitation
that target shareholders and target managers experience as a result of Saturday Night
Specials.
87 Professors Bebchuk and Gilson have made this argument. Bebchuk I, supra note
4, at 1033; Gilson I, supra note 4, at 63. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel answer by
saying, "We suspect that the costs of a drawn-out auction exceed the costs of an acquisi-
tion without auction, followed by retransfers, but we cannot be sure." Easterbrook &
Fischel III, supra note 1, at 14. They also argue that even after an auction, the winning
bidder may have to sell parts of the target to maximize its value. Id. They base their
position on hunches about transaction costs, and it seems counterintuitive. A series of
tender offers in which each new buyer is anxious to replace the old managers seems
significantly disruptive at each step; one management change seems far less expensive.
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may lose small shareholders as the secondary markets become for-
bidding to all but the sophisticated and vigilant institutional or large
scale investors.
The fourth, and perhaps most important, cost is the loss ofjoint
gains often created through sophisticated negotiation. If bargaining
parties cooperate by exchanging accurate information on their in-
terests and by expanding the number of issues on the table, they can
make trade-offs that maximize their joint welfare. 8s Tender offer
payments can take a variety of forms, including cash, equity securi-
ties in the bidder, and debt instruments in either the bidder or the
target. The target shareholders and the bidder could, with respon-
sible bargaining, agree on packages that both prefer over a straight
cash purchase. In short, encouraging parties to bargain coopera-
tively is inherently valuable. Disabling the target in the bargaining
between targets and bidders frustrates this process. The bidder,
without any negotiation, gets a bargain price from a short duration
two-tiered tender offer and any serious effort to bargain compre-
hensively with the target managers to produce a better result takes
time, putting the bargain price of the tender offer at risk.
III
Two PROPOSALS
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have demonstrated that our
legal system should be sensitive to the position of first bidders; the
issue is how to protect them. Two straightforward changes in ex-
isting legal rules would protect first bidders and strengthen signifi-
cantly the salutary effect of hostile tender offers without a wholesale
revision of the current system. First, Congress should amend sec-
tion 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193489 to require a pu-
tative bidder to declare its intentions when acquiring more than ten
percent of the equity securities of the target. Currently, the require-
ment is triggered at five percent. 90 This change better compensates
88 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 24 (advocating nonadversarial negotiation
as means to maximize interests of both parties).
89 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982).
90 Id. Congress would also need to amend § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to enable a losing first bidder to sell to the winning bidder without incurring
§ 16(b) liability. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Under § 16(b) the holder of over 10% of
the equity securities of a publicly-held company cannot buy and sell the company's se-
curities within a six-month period; violators must turn all profits over to the company.
The courts have created an exception for takeout mergers but remain reluctant to create
an exception for negotiated sales with the winning bidder. See, e.g., Texas Int'l Airlines
v. National Airlines, 714 F.2d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to uphold § 16(b)
exception permitting beneficial owner of 10% of issuer's stock to trade as insider), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984). But see Heublein v. General Cinema Corp., 722 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1983) (limiting application of § 16(b) when hostility, no exchange of informa-
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first bidders when they lose. Second, state courts or legislatures
should define and enforce standards of fiduciary misconduct for tar-
get management based on their role as negotiating agents for share-
holders. This change largely eliminates a target's ability to block
completely most tender offers and gives a first bidder a better
chance at success.
A. Increasing the Five Percent Rule in Section 13(d) of the
Williams Act
First bidders are not always discouraged by the possibility of
being outbid by others because they often profit by tendering their
shares in the target to the winning bidder. Rule 13(d), however,
limits the profits of a first bidder by requiring any person who ac-
quires more than five percent of a class of equity securities to dis-
close its position and its future intentions. A potential bidder must
disclose its intentions to mount a tender offer once it acquires a five
percent position in the target, and public disclosure has three ef-
fects: first, the market price rises in anticipation of the tender offer;
second, bidders who want to free ride on the first bidder's research
are notified; and third, the SEC is alerted that additional market
purchases may represent a creeping tender offer.9 1 In sum, a first
bidder's acquisition of a five percent interest in the target makes
additional large-scale privately negotiated market purchases much
more costly; any reasonably paced takeover attempt must proceed
after such a disclosure via a tender offer.
Raising the rule 13(d) limit to ten percent will allow first bid-
ders to purchase more stock in the target at pre-tender offer market
prices. If a first bidder loses, it can reap the difference between pre-
and post-tender offer prices. The first bidder, recognizing that it
cannot match a higher bid, tenders its stock in the target and re-
ceives a pro rata portion of the tender offer premium.9 2 The first
bidder, even if completely excluded from participation in the tender
tion, and involuntary conversion exist between buyer and holder of over 10% of issuer's
shares) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1416 (1984).
The proposal in the text may also require a revision of the pre-merger notification
program in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 to correspond with the notification
provision in the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
91 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 821-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
682 F.2d 355 (2d. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
92 In a recent study the mean premium for the first step of two-tiered tender offers
was 63.5%o. SEC Release No. 34-21079, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1129 (June 29,
1984).
Losing a tender offer has some risk, however, as Mesa Petroleum discovered in its
bid for Unocal Corporation. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985). In an effort to defeat Mesa's tender offer, Unocal Corporation made an
exchange offer for its own shares but excluded the shares Mesa held. Applying the busi-
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offer, may profit significantly when its stock is included in the sec-
ond-stage takeout merger.93 Since the company executing a sec-
ond-stage takeout merger must typically pay the maximum pre-
tender offer price, a losing bidder with substantial pre-tender offer
purchases should not lose money and often gains significantly.
B. Refining the Standards of Conduct for Target Managers
The second recommended change is that courts should stop ap-
plying the business judgment doctrine or rule,94 the primary pur-
pose test,95 or a combination of the two in evaluating a target
management's conduct when responding to a hostile tender offer.
The business judgment rule provides a safe harbor for directors or
officers who make honest, informed business decisions which they
reasonably believe will serve the best interests of their corpora-
tions.96 Courts refuse to second-guess such decisions even if they
eventually harm the company's financial position.97 The deci-
ness judgment rule, the court vacated a preliminary injunction enjoining Unocal's ex-
change offer. Id. at 958-59.
The post-exchange offer price was lower than the price Mesa paid for the shares.
Estimates of Mesa's losses run from $20 to $80 million, even though Unocal relented
somewhat and allowed Mesa to exchange some of its shares. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1985,
at Dl, col. 3. The situation appears unique in that the winning bidder, the target itself,
was unwilling to include Mesa because the target wanted to prefer its original sharehold-
ers whom the exchange offer protected. This factor separates the Unocal situation from
most cases in which an outsider bidder gains control. In such cases, the new bidder
wants to eliminate any large rival block of shareholders and, therefore, to include all
shareholders in its tender offer. Even Unocal, in the end, gave concessions to Mesa in
order to forestall future action after it had defeated Mesa's bid. Id.
93 The mean premium offered for second-step takeout mergers is over 41%. SEC
Release No. 34-21079, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1129 (June 29, 1985).
94 The doctrine protects board decisions; the rule shields individual directors from
liability. Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Pro-
ject: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611-12 (1985).
95 A second test for evaluating target managers' acts is the "primary purpose" test,
which originated in Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). In Cheff, the
court held that the target management would be liable only if its "sole or primary mo-
tive" was to perpetuate itself in office. Id. at 556. Thus, the presence of a valid purpose
exonerates management even if a defensive tactic collaterally enhances the managers'
power. E.g., Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960) (use of corporate funds
by directors to purchase corporation's own stock held to further proper purpose of pre-
serving corporation's business policies). In practice, however, the business judgment
rule and the primary purpose test are very similar with the only difference being that
under the primary purpose test the directors have the burden of proof. Cheffv. Mathes,
41 Del. Ch. at 503-04, 199 A.2d at 555. Recently, Delaware courts have simply mixed
the tests without discussing their differences. See, e.g, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
96 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4 1985); see also Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Prussin, The BusinessJudgment Rule
and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw 27 (1981).
97 The business judgment rule is often stated as a "presumption" that directors and
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sionmaker must be disinterested for the rule to apply. 98 In cases in
which personal and company interests obviously conflict, courts dis-
regard the business judgment rule and apply a more rigorous duty
of loyalty standard.9 9 If the conflict is not obvious, the complaining
shareholder bears the burden of proving that an official of the com-
pany has a conflict of interest. If the shareholder carries the burden,
the burden shifts to the implicated official to prove that the con-
tested transaction was fair and reasonable.100
Although target managers who fear for their jobs have a per-
sonal interest in the outcome of a hostile tender offer, most courts
have applied the business judgment rule to insulate target managers
who engaged in defensive tactics against a hostile tender offer.10 1
Instead of assuming that target managers inevitably have a personal
stake in the outcome of a hostile tender offer and thus imposing the
more rigorous duty of loyalty standard, most courts have initially
saddled the complaining shareholders with the burden to show that
the target managers had a personal interest in the outcome of the
officers have acted correctly. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
("It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.").
98 E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984) ("the
business judgment rule governs only where the directors are not shown to have a self-
interest in the transaction"); Lewis v. S. L. & E. Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980)
("the business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of
interest").
99 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.08-5.12 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1984). Thus, the definition
of "duty of loyalty matters" is crucial, and control contests are commonly excluded.
100 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Once a prima facie showing is made that directors have a self-interest in a particular
corporate transaction, the burden shifts to them to demonstrate that the transaction is
fair and serves the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.").
101 E.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (use
of "springing warrants"); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.
1983) (sale of treasury stock and lock up option on treasury stock), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
550 (1983); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (dismissing complaint for
failure to plead that directors intended solely to keep themselves in control). A recent
Delaware Supreme Court case, however, may indicate the beginnings of a withdrawal
from a strict application of the traditional business judgment rule. In Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the court, noting "the omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests," undertook a "threshold" ex-
amination of the grounds for a tender offer defense. Id. at 954. The directors had to
show "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness existed." Id. at 955. Despite this language apparently limiting the application of
the business judgment rule in a tender offer, the court stated that the directors "satisfy
that burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation," id., which mimics the
old standard and merely shifts the burden of proof. Later in the opinion, however, the
Court did add a potential new substantive twist to the rule: "If a defensive measure is to
come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to
the threat posed." Id. at 955.
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tender offer.' 0 2 In these cases the burden of showing specific per-
sonal gain has often proven insurmountable because some courts
demand proof of self-interest beyond that related to continued em-
ployment. 10 3 In cases in which the courts do reach the fairness of a
particular tender offer defense, courts commonly accept, often inap-
propriately, the managers' justifications. 10 4 Both phenomena arise
primarily from the courts' lack of a mature conceptual basis for de-
termining when the decisions of target managers have a proper cor-
porate purpose. 0 5
Consider, for example, the paucity of analysis in Norlin Corp. v.
102 E.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (sharehold-
ers must show management's personal interest before burden shifts to management);
Grouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Horwitz
v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985). But see Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (directors must show "good
faith and reasonable investigation" for business judgment doctrine to apply).
103 In those jurisdictions that put the initial burden of proof on the plaintiffs, the
cases are in total disarray on the very significant question of what plaintiffs must show to
shift the burden of proof to the defendants. On the question of the effect of directors
remaining on the board after the merger, compare Grouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980), with Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 1981-82
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,284-85 (S.D. Ohio), rev'd on other grounds, 669 F.2d
366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). See also Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F.
Supp. 468 (D.NJ. 1985) (3 of 12 directors were managers, other 9 held rights in new
preferred stock designed to block offer; business judgment rule applies) (appeal
pending).
104 E.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Buf-
falo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550
(1984); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985). But see Norling Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussed supra note 51).
105 Courts troubled by a traditional application of the business judgment rule and
yet unwilling to change occasionally turn to other provisions of state law to invalidate a
defense. See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,066
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1985) (Rights Plan was unauthorized stock reclassification and unrea-
sonable restraint on alienability) (appeal pending); Asarco v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468
(D.N.J. 1985) (poison pill preferred plan constituted illegal discrimination among share-
holders) (appeal pending). But cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985) (discrimination in self-tender approved). The kind of analysis used by these
courts, however, often has the same problem as the analysis in Norlin, supra note 51. A
conclusory declaration that managers have usurped traditional shareholder powers is no
answer when a delegation of negotiation power from shareholders to an agent may be in
the shareholders' best interests. In some cases the managers misbehave, and in others
they do not. At issue is what kinds of tactics are legitimate when target managers are
acting properly as bargaining agents. Some are presumptively illegitimate because they
establish dangerous precedent for board power in other contexts (board-created super-
majority provisions, for example, e.g., Televest v. Outdoor Sports Indus., Inc., C.A. No.
5798 (Del. Ch. March 8, 1978)), some are presumptively illegitimate because they signal
board misbehavior (nonreversible poison pill preferred plans), and some are illegitimate




Rooney, Pace Inc., 10 6 the only significant case that has voided defen-
sive tactics on the grounds that the directors violated the standards
of fiduciary responsibility. The Second Circuit attempted to distin-
guish Southeastern Public Service Co. v. Graniteville Co., 107 a case uphold-
ing a similar tactic. In both cases the target management created an
Employee Stock Option Plan and Trust (ESOP) s08 and funded it
with target stock to make it more difficult for a hostile bidder to
obtain control. The district court in Southeastern Public Service Co. ap-
plied the business judgment rule, stating that opposition to a tender
offer "which in the best judgment of management is detrimental to
the corporation does not result in a breach of fiduciary duty."' 09
The Second Circuit, after noting that the district court had correctly
stated the law, distinguished the opinion because the directors self-
interestedly used the ESOP to "retain control." t 0 The target man-
agement in Southeastern Public Service Co., however, was also attempt-
ing to maintain control. The Second Circuit must have decided that
the creation of an ESOP to stop tender offers is not always suspect,
but it gave no guidance on why the facts before it supported relief,
while the facts in Southeastern Public Service Co. did not. The Second
Circuit, like so many other courts, simply hid behind a conclusory
declaration of self-interest in deciding the case, although the decla-
ration was an affirmative, rather than the more common negative
finding. Courts seem conceptually rudderless when attempting to
determine whether the target managers' decision to block a tender
offer is ultimately fair to the shareholders."'
Courts that have addressed the issue have understood intui-
tively that target managers do have a role to play in hostile tender
offers, but their resort to the business judgment rule or its variants
has severely hampered the development of a mature case law on the
matter. A more sensible judicial approach would treat management
decisions in response to hostile tender offers as courts now treat
management decisions on a compensation question that affects all
managing officials (i.e., establishing a benefits plan for all control-
ling officials or establishing an across the board pay increase). 1 2 In
106 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
107 No. 83-1028-8 (D.S.C. May 19, 1983).
108 See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982).
109 No. 83-1028-8 (D.S.C. May 19, 1983).
110 Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 267 n.13. Likewise, the court's strong language con-
demning "a wholesale wresting of corporate power," see supra note 51, does not square
with its apparent support of the Southeastern Public Service Co. case.
111 See infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
112 Because all controlling officials, including directors, benefit from such programs,
they cannot rely on authorization or ratification by disinterested directors. A similar
problem arises when directors set their own compensation.
Some judges have identified the inherent conflict of interest affecting target manag-
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such compensation decisions self-interest is assumed, and unless
there is knowledgeable ratification by the shareholders, the officials
have the burden of proving that the decision is fair to the corpora-
tion. t" 3 In the event of shareholder ratification, the court will re-
view the quality of the management disclosures and, if the
disclosures are adequate, apply a waste of corporate assets standard
to catch extreme cases.114 An identical general standard could be
applied sensibly in the context of hostile tender offers. The stan-
dard of fairness in tender offers, however, would take its conceptual
cues solely from the reasonableness of the target managers' acts in
light of their role as a negotiating agent for the shareholders.
1. Reactive Tactics That Defeat a Two-Tiered Tender Offer
At the core of the proper definition of fiduciary in the context of
tender offers is a definition of the proper role of target management
as negotiating agents. Target management's acts designed to defeat
a two-tiered tender offer and enable the company to remain in-
dependent should be inherently suspect. Only two conditions jus-
tify the intentional defeat of a two-tiered tender offer: 1 5 a target's
ers, but they have argued for a simple shift in the burden of proof. See Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299-301 (7th Cir.) (Cudelry, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981);Johnson v. Trueblook; 629 F.2d 287, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1980) (RosenJ,
dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). See also Crane v. Harsio Corp., 511 F. Supp.
294, 305 (D. Del. 1981). A shift of the burden of proof is not enough, however, and, not
surprisingly, the judges were criticized for their inability to articulate a coherent rule for
when the burden shifts. E.g., Veasey, Further Reflections on Court Review of Judgements of
Directors: Is the Judicial Process Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAW. 1373, 1374 n.5 (1985).
In tender offers there can be no disinterested directors unless they are similar to
those described supra text accompanying note 47. Typical outside directors also lose
their positions with a change in control and are inevitably influenced by their future
prospects with the target. They do have less to lose than target managers because sala-
ries for outside directors are not as large, but their salaries give them a personal stake in
the outcome.
113 See AMERICAN LAW INsTrtrE, supra note 99, § 5.09(a)(1)(c). A similar standard
applies to transactions between the corporation and a controlling official when disinter-
ested board of director approval is unavailable. See id. § 5.08(a)(2)(c).
114 Many courts will require proof of fairness even in the event of ratification by
shareholders or disinterested board members. See Buxbaum, supra note 16.
115 Tender offers for 100% of the stock, used in junk bond financed bust-up take-
overs, for example, do not create a stampede effect among target shareholders. Accord-
ingly, target managers' efforts to defeat such a tender offer should be even more limited.
Tactics designed to stall or block completely such offers can be justified only by the rare
circumstances noted supra note 19. Ideally, in all other cases the target managers should
be limited to providing shareholders with information on other bidders or on whether
the only extant bidder will offer more if shareholders hold out. See Gilson II, supra note
4, at 861-62. However, those who must circulate opinions and impressions on financial
transactions risk lawsuits brought by others who argue from hindsight that the disclo-
sures were misleading or ill-informed. This risk may result in excess caution in the dis-
closure documents-documents that are so general or so qualified that they convey no
information. Pragmatically, therefore, the best approach may be to let target managers
1985]
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management may hold valuable nonpublic information which would
decline considerably in value if publicly disclosed,11 6 and a target's
management may know or have strong suspicions that a bidder will,
after securing control through a partial tender offer, illegally loot
the company to the disadvantage of the remaining minority share-
holders.117 If target managers rely on either justification, courts
should impose a heavy burden of persuasion. 1 8 The best solution
would institute a burden of proof that would require target manage-
ment to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence why acts
designed to defeat a tender offer are in the best interests of the
shareholders and a standard of proper purpose that limits the target
management to proving one of the two conditions noted above in
justification. 119
bargain on behalf of target shareholders even in tender offers for all a target's stock,
subject to standards similar to those outlined below.
116 See, e.g., supra note 19.
117 E.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (sellers of con-
trolling interest had duty to protect other shareholders from buyer's looting of corpo-
rate assets). Because minority shareholders have standing to sue looters, one can
respectably argue against including the second condition at all. Accord Easterbrook &
Fischel I, supra note 1, at 1184-85 (arguing that desire to loot corporation is unlikely to
motivate tender offer, and looters cannot often escape detection). A strict standard of
justification, requiring that looting be a clear and substantial danger, would limit man-
agement's use of the defense as a makeweight while providing some protection for
shareholders who are unaware of the danger. The definition of looting, however,
should not necessarily include all cases in which a takeout merger is proposed at a price
that is less than the tender offer premium. See supra note 29. One indication of looting,
on the other hand, is a weighted average of the tender offer and second-stage merger
prices that is lower than the pre-tender offer market price.
Interestingly, a simple disclosure to shareholders that an offeror is a looter may
increase the stampede effect and facilitate the tender offer.
118 A target manager's conscious attempt to defeat a tender offer could be justified
as an attempt to drive a potential acquirer into negotiating with target managers to exe-
cute a control change through a statutory merger. There is no compelling reason, how-
ever, for target managers to prefer a negotiated statutory merger over a negotiated
tender offer.
119 The defensive tactics of Unocal Corporation, sanctioned by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), would
probably fail the standard. Unocal offered to pay its shareholders $72 in senior debt
securities if Mesa, a hostile bidder, acquired control of Unocal through a tender at $54 a
share. Incredibly, the Unocal board itself took advantage of the inability of its share-
holders to engage in a collective response. The Unocal exchange offer tempted its own
shareholders to hold their stock, because each hoped that enough other shareholders
would tender at $54 to Mesa so that Mesa would acquire control and the holdouts could
participate in the exchange offer at $72. The result, of course, was that no one ten-
dered, and the Unocal shareholders lost both the tender offer price and the exchange
offer price. If the Unocal shareholders could have acted collectively, they would have
chosen a blended price of the tender offer and the exchange offer, tendering the mini-
mum shares requested to Mesa and the remainder to Unocal and giving each share-
holder an equal share of the total returns. Unocal eventually lifted the condition that
Mesa acquire control. At this point, Unocal was offering its own shareholders a compet-
ing bid that, if accepted, recapitalized the company by replacing a large portion of the
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On the other hand, acts by target managers that are designed
solely to improve the tender offer price but that fail, resulting in the
loss of the tender offer premium, can be justified as calculated gam-
bles and should be evaluated under a more lenient standard. Target
managers should bear the burden of demonstrating by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the gamble was reasonable. What will
often distinguish these gambles from those acts intended to defeat
completely tender offers is that target managers used reversible de-
fenses. 120 When defensive tactics are reversible, management can
use them to gain bargaining leverage and remove them once an ap-
propriate compromise is reached. The tactics are not a complete
bar to all future negotiation over the tender offer premium.
A threshold standard then for applying the more lenient stan-
dards of proof and justification is whether the defenses employed
were reversible. This threshold standard is not conclusive, however,
as a court may find that a company's refusal to remove a defense is
motivated by a desire to block completely a tender offer rather than
by a desire to gain temporary negotiating leverage. If so, the
stricter standards of justification detailed above should apply.' 21
The application of the more lenient standards require a court to de-
cide whether managers who employ a reversible defense to gain ne-
gotiating leverage have negotiated poorly and unreasonably. If
managers delay long enough to lose the first, and perhaps only bid-
der, they must have sound reasons for doing so. There must be, for
example, an imminent competing bid in the offing or strong evi-
dence that justifies their mistaken belief that the initial bidder would
give more.
Whenever the weighted average of the tender offer premium
company's equity with debt. The Unocal exchange offer defeated Mesa's bid, and the
Delaware Supreme Court approved the tactic. Id. at 957.
The court held that the Unocal board was justified in defeating Mesa's bid because
it was a two-tiered tender offer "designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at
the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the
back end of the transaction." Id. at 956. The court's error was in not requiring the
Unocal board to justify why Mesa's bid, substantially in excess of the current market
price (which the Court never even mentioned in its opinion), was "inadequate." Two
accounting firms hired by the board opined that $60 per share was a reasonable price,
but where were the other buyers who were willing to offer such a price? Studies that find
a firm worth more than the market price of its stock are inherently suspect. See supra
note 67. The court also relied on a questionable study that found that target sharehold-
ers benefit from defeated offers in a majority of cases. See supra note 64. The court, in
essence, gave target managers the green light to block any two-tiered tender offer.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
121 A shareholder should be allowed to produce evidence that management in-
tended to defeat the tender offer even though it employed reversible tactics. If target
managers cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they intended to nego-
tiate with rather than block completely the hostile bidder, then the target managers must
justify the blocking doctrine under the harsher standard.
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and the anticipated second-stage merger price (or the value of the
stock if there is no merger) exceeds the market price of the target
stock, 122 the target managers have not been able to find other
higher bidders within a reasonable period, and the initial bidder
credibly refuses to offer more, the target managers should be hard
pressed to justify any further refusals. In short, the only safe course
for managers responding to most tender offers is a successfully ne-
gotiated bargain with the highest bidder.
If defensive tactics designed solely for stalling a tender offer in
order to provide bargaining leverage must eventually be neutralized
once target management has secured the best price, the effect of
these tactics on bidders depends on their sensitivity to time delays.
Target management has leverage in the decision to delay; through
delay the target can test the "give" in the bidder's price and find
other buyers. Yet bidders who offer above market prices know that
target managers should, at some point, agree to sell by withdrawing
any artificially created block to a tender offer, and if bidders estab-
lish a credible time deadline for an attractive final offer, target man-
agers may find it difficult to delay further. In sum, legal standards
that encourage the proper use of reversible defensive tactics weaken
the bargaining position of the target (compared to its current posi-
tion), but they do not disable it.123
The effect of the Williams Act is to make more difficult the tar-
get board's justification of its use of delaying tactics, for the Act it-
self, supplemented by SEC rules, creates a twenty day period in
which the target can solicit subsequent buyers. 124 In most cases the
target can entice subsequent bidders to appear within this period.
The Act does not, however, aid the target in negotiating with the
initial bidder if no other buyers can be found. In these cases the
target may need a credible threat to stall the offer beyond the twenty
day period in order to have significant bargaining leverage.
This proposal invalidates many of the poison pill stock plans
currently in use. A target company typically creates a poison pill
stock plan by issuing preferred stock to its shareholders, which they
can, in the event of a tender offer, convert into a large quantity of
122 The argument that the market is undervaluing the stock should not be applicable
unless the narrow conditions outlined supra note 19 exist. Moreover, any arguments
based on a pessimistic appraisal of the second-stage merger price or of the value of non-
tendered stock should be suspect, and the target managers should be pressed to sustain
their burden of proof on the claims.
123 Studies have shown that under current rules most of the gain created by a hostile
tender offer accrues to the target shareholders. See Dennis, supra note 8, at 317 n.175;
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 3, at 197 (target shareholders gain 16 to 34%;
bidder shareholders gain 2.3%, approximately a 9 to 11% return on the investment in
the target).
124 See supra note 8.
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the bidder's common stock or redeem on generous terms. 125 If tar-
get management can negate the conversion or redemption features
at its option, such plans may be legitimate reversible tactics, en-
abling target managers to negotiate on behalf of their shareholders.
Target managers can negotiate for a higher price and withdraw the
conversion or redemption feature when the deal is cut.1 26 If man-
agement cannot negate the conversion or redemption features, the
tactic is suspect, and courts should apply the more stringent stan-
dards applicable when management acts intentionally to defeat a
tender offer. 127 Because some of the poison pill preferred stock cur-
rently issued cannot be easily detoxified, they are of questionable
validity. 1
28
On the other hand, an example of a reversible share purchase
rights plan is currently before the Delaware Supreme Court in Mo-
ran v. Household International Inc. 129 Under the Household plan, com-
mon shareholders are given rights to buy Household preferred
stock if anyone makes a tender offer for over thirty percent of
Household's common shares. The rights are out of the money, but
if a tender offer succeeds and the buyer attempts a second-stage
takeout merger, the buyer must exchange at a bargain price its own
common stock for the rights. The exchange right, however, is not
absolute. Prior to the tender offer, or before a bidder gains a twenty
percent interest, Household's board can redeem the rights for a
nominal price. Because the tactic is reversible, it is not inherently
suspect. The critical issue is how Household's board uses its
125 Fair price provisions are built into the redemption formula: on a specified
change of control the preferred stock is redeemable at the highest price paid by the
bidder in the last 12 months. The conversion feature gives preferred stockholders the
right, in the event of a second-stage squeeze-out merger, to exchange for substitute
preferred stock in the acquirer. The conversion rights "flip over," that is, the preferred
stock of the acquirer can itself be converted into common stock of the acquirer, equal in
value to the highest price paid by the acquirer in the last 12 months for target shares. A
variation of the convertible preferred stock dividend plan is the share purchase rights
plan. The target issues a dividend consisting of rights to purchase common stock that
are contingent on a change in ownership. The rights flip over in the event of a merger
when they entitle their holders to stock in the acquiring company at favorable terms.
126 Once stock on stock rights are issued, a straight withdrawal of the conversion or
redemption feature by the board is prohibited by state corporate laws, which categorize
such action as a stock reclassification requiring a shareholder vote. On the other hand,
withdrawing stock or stock rights dividends after declaration but before issuance poses
no problem, and special redemption features may be built into the dividends that allow
target managers to redeem them at minimal cost, even if issued. See infra note 129.
127 See supra text accompanying note 119.
128 The argument also applies to several other common defenses: "white squire"
arrangements in which the target issues stock to a friendly holder, subject to a standstill
agreement; "crown jewel" defenses in which the target sells, usually contingent on a
change of control, its attractive assets; and most other "scorched earth" defenses.
129 Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985).
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power. 130
2. Tactics That Favor One Bidder Over Others or That
Create an Auction
The basic analysis detailed above also applies when target man-
agement acts to defeat one tender offeror by favoring another with a
bargain price on assets (the crown jewel defense) or on stock (the
lock-up or leg-up options). 3 ' The problem is the most obvious
whenever such a defense favors one bidder over another who is of-
fering an equivalent or even lower price; target managers are most
likely acting in their self-interest, receiving a bribe of some sort in
the form of a pension plan or of guarantees of future employment
from the favored bidder. But the defense is also inherently suspect
even if the favored bidder offers a higher price. In such a case, a
defense that permanently disadvantages the original bidders also
signals misbehavior because the target managers are not content to
let the hostile bidder put in a potentially higher bid; lock-up de-
fenses effectively preclude the hostile bidder from making a
counteroffer.1
3 2
130 See Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985);
APL Corp. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 85-C-990 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1985) (prelimi-
nary injunctions refused to plaintiffs challenging similar rights plans). A misuse of the
defense is evident in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The target, from the outset, had no intention of redeeming the warrants; it used
them as a complete and effective bar to the bidder's offer. See supra note 20.
A few of the poison pill stock (or stock rights or warrants) plans have a seductive
feature: they guarantee to all shareholders who do not tender the tender offer price.
The plans force the acquiring company who executes a second-stage takeout merger to
pay tender offer prices and force an acquiring company who does not execute such a
merger to redeem, at the shareholder's option, stock at the tender offer price. Unlike
some plans that give target shareholders extreme bargains in the event of a tender offer
or a second-stage merger, such plans merely guarantee that all shareholders can claim
the tender offer premium. Thus, the plans eliminate the possibility of a front-end
loaded tender offer, that is, a tender offer in which those shareholders who tender get
more than those who do not. Target managers argue, therefore, that these plans are
legitimate because, like fair price charter amendments, see supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text, they do nothing more than eliminate the stampede effect. The argument is
attractive but not convincing. Such plans, unless reversible, permanently close the door
on potential offerors who want to buy only enough stock to control a publicly held com-
pany. The loss of any opportunity to entice and negotiate with these potential offerors is
at substantial costs to target shareholders and should not be incurred absent a share-
holder vote, which should be required for all automatic defenses
131 The crown jewel option describes the sale of a prize division or asset to a pre-
ferred bidder (called a "white knight") contingent on the bidder's victory over the hos-
tile bidder for control of the target. E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Whittaker v. Edjar, 535 F. Supp. 933
(N.D. Ill. 1982). Lock-up and leg-up options are grants of a stock option to a white
knight to preclude competition and to furnish an edge in the bidding contest. E.g., Data
Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983); Marshall Field & Co.
v. Ichan, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
132 Just before this Article went to press, the Delaware Chancery Court decided the
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Accordingly, the courts should treat a defense that permanently
disadvantages the bidder similarly to a defense that defeats a single
tender offer, with two modifications. First, the first condition noted
above for justifying the defeat of a tender offer (nonpublic valuable
information) is not a credible reason for favoring one bidder over
another.133 The second condition, however, that the disfavored bid-
der will be a looter, can also justify permanently favoring one bidder
over another. A second justification would be that the disfavored
bidder is financially overextended and unwilling to make good on its
promises, either in the tender offer itself or in the second-stage
merger. Again these latter two situations are unlikely, and manag-
ers who rely on these justifications should be put to the heavy bur-
den of proof noted above, the clear and convincing standard.
Thus, the use of defenses to stimulate an auction is legitimate
only if, first, they disadvantage all existing bidders to give target
managers time to find other bidders, and second, they are reversible
so that once an auction is established, the bidding is unaffected by
the tactic. Even so, if target managers hold off all existing bidders
too long and lose them in an effort to create an auction, they should
have to justify their gamble as reasonable under the circumstances.
3. Target Managers Who Do Nothing
A residual danger of target management self-dealing remains
even if target managers neither defeat a sole tender offeror nor
favor one bidder in an auction. A bidder may bribe a target's man-
agers not to negotiate on behalf of the target shareholders. For ex-
ample, if an initial bidder offers lucrative positions to the target's
managers if the bidder gains control, the target managers' loyalty to
their own shareholders is compromised. When target managers
gain personally from a tender offer, other than in the form of stock
appreciation in the target, their acts are inherently suspect. In such
cases the target's managers must show with clear and convincing
evidence that their actions served the shareholders' best interests.
Only if the target's managers receive no benefits from the successful
bidder should the standard of proof be relaxed in the face of com-
plaints that they did not negotiate for better terms.13 4
Revlon case on these grounds. Revlon Loses a Takeover Ruling, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1985,
at D l, col. 2.
133 It is not an argument for favoring one of two bidders but only an argument for
refusing to accept anything but a minimum price.
134 Target managers with high severance agreements (golden parachutes) may also
have an incentive to not interfere with a tender offer. Idealistically, the severance plan
should encourage target managers to bargain honestly without regard to their future
employment. If the plan provides overgenerous payments unrelated to the price of the
target's stock, managers may not bargain hard enough for the interests of target share-
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Courts, however, can be too harsh in evaluating a manager's
duty to negotiate when there is evidence of payments from the ac-
quirer. In Smith v. Van Gorkom,135 for example, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the managers of a company selling its as-
sets violated their fiduciary duty by, among other things, agreeing
with a potential purchaser not to solicit competing offers and not to
furnish information to other potential bidders. Although the agree-
ment ostensibly allowed the target some time to receive competitive
offers and to accept them if they were later than the outstanding
offer, the court concluded that the conditions on these rights were
stifling. 136 Thus, the court held that the target managers had failed
to test the market before accepting an outstanding offer price for
the sale of control.
137
The basic reasoning is sound, but unfortunately clouded by the
court's discussion of the target's market price as "historically de-
pressed," "consistently undervalu[ing] the worth of .. .the stock,"
not indicative of "true value," and not reflecting the "inherent value
of the company."' 3 8 This language reflects a misunderstanding of
stock prices and a confusion over the reasons for control premi-
ums. 139 Justice McNeilly, in dissent, noted that other bidders were
in fact showing sustained interest. 140 This evidence, absent evi-
dence on the reasons for the withdrawal of these companies, implies
that the price accepted was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Some readers may dismiss this analysis as too lenient on target
management, allowing them to continue to protect their own inter-
ests with a wide variety of defenses while portraying falsely a con-
cern for the welfare of target shareholders. These readers, however,
underestimate the scope of the proposed limitations.
Any irreversible defense that defeats a tender offer with the re-
sult that the target remains an independent company will create a
holders. Whether golden parachutes harm target shareholders or are a legitimate form
of salary incentive, therefore, depends on the details of the agreement. See also Note,
Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE
L.J. 909 (1985).
135 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
136 Id. at 883. Interestingly, the majority opinion did not comment on whether
other bidders were in fact contacted by the target managers in the case. In the dissent,
however, Justice McNeilly argued that an investment banker was hired to find better
offers, and the bankers prepared and mailed to over 150 companies a brochure on the
target's history. Four companies showed interest but did not make offers. Id. at 896.
137 Id. at 877-78.
138 Id. at 875-76.
139 See supra notes 20, 21, 67, and 119.
140 488 A.2d at 896 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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substantial risk of personal liability.141 When target managers seek
to defeat a tender offer, they must show with clear and convincing
evidence either that they possessed valuable nonpublic information
or that they reasonably believed the bidder would loot the corpora-
tion. If management inadvertently defeats a tender offer while ne-
gotiating a higher tender offer price, using a reversible defensive
tactic, the management must show with a preponderance of the evi-
dence that they made a reasonable bargaining gamble in holding
out. Moreover, under the analysis, any defense that permanently
favors one bidder over another creates a substantial risk of personal
liability. Target managers who receive personal gains from a bidder
must show with clear and convincing evidence that their actions in
negotiating or not negotiating with the bidder were fair to target
shareholders. Finally because most legitimate defensive tactics con-
sist of arrangements that target managers can and in most cases will
reverse, the power of such tactics in stopping tender offers is signifi-
cantly curtailed.
The proposed standards of fiduciary responsibility will test the
abilities of the courts. The beauty of the business judgment rule is
that courts can avoid meddling in business decisions. But in conflict
of interest situations courts must shoulder the burden of protecting
the potential victims, and tender offers are such a case. The passiv-
ity rule appears to provide a quick fix with minimal court involve-
ment, but the rule eventually would require courts to assess motive
and effect under complicated circumstances that are not dissimilar
from courts' responsibility under this proposal. Courts applying the
passivity rule, for example, at minimum would have to determine
whether management employed a given tactic for defensive pur-
poses or whether they were motivated by routine business concerns,
and the inquiries are likely to be more complex as avoidance behav-
ior becomes more devious. The standards proposed in this Article
are not open-ended; they build in benchmarks that should aid
judges in determining whether generally empowered target manag-
ers are acting responsibly as bargaining agents.
141 The extent of a director's personal liability for acts undertaken in his capacity as
a director has been the subject of debate. See generally Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's
Protection of Its Directors and Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513.
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